Explaining the Sectarian Violence in the Middle East: a Conflict Analysis of the Case Study of Saudi Arabia and Iran by Eltally, Ahmed Elsayed
Portland State University 
PDXScholar 
Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses 
12-10-2019 
Explaining the Sectarian Violence in the Middle East: 
a Conflict Analysis of the Case Study of Saudi Arabia 
and Iran 
Ahmed Elsayed Eltally 
Portland State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds 
 Part of the Islamic Studies Commons, Near and Middle Eastern Studies Commons, and the Peace and 
Conflict Studies Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Eltally, Ahmed Elsayed, "Explaining the Sectarian Violence in the Middle East: a Conflict Analysis of the 
Case Study of Saudi Arabia and Iran" (2019). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 5444. 
https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.7317 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and 





Explaining the Sectarian Violence in the Middle East: 
 




















A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the 

















Portland State University 
2019 
© 2019 Ahmed Elsayed Eltally 
i 
Abstract 
The Middle East has been rife with conflicts, extremism, and sectarianism in recent decades. 
Many explanations attribute the rise of sectarianism in the Middle East to the historical 
divide between Sunni and Shia Muslims, while others attribute it to power or identity 
concerns. This thesis explores the factors that contributed to the rise of contemporary 
sectarianism in the Middle East through the case study of Saudi-Iranian rivalry. The 
literature on the history of the Middle East, Islam, theories of international relations, and 
conflict studies underlines how Saudi Arabia and Iran use sectarianism to further their 
interests. This research examines how key elements, including the rule of government, 
ideology, and economic interests, contribute to the escalation of the sectarianism. A 
Conflict Analysis Framework analyzes the conflict from five different dimensions: 
strategic, political, socioeconomic, psychological, and cultural. This framework and 
qualitative methods argue that the milestone events, such as the Iranian Revolution in 1979, 
the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Arab Spring uprisings, and the Iran Nuclear Deal, 
affect the geopolitics of the region. This study offers a multi-dimensional analysis, so 
policymakers can gain a better understanding of the geopolitics of the Middle East to work 
towards its stability. 
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 Note on Transliteration 
In transcribing Arabic and Persian into English, the plural of Arabic words has been marked 
by the addition of “S” to the singular. Also, the Arabic language, in particular, contains 
sounds that do not exist in English, and there are several ways of transliterating foreign 
words, such as spelling names of Hussein and the Islamic prophet’s name, Mohammed. I 
have chosen Mohammed and Hussein and stayed with theses spellings for the sake of 
consistency. Moreover, for the word Shia, there are many ways of writing this word, such 
as Shiite and Shi’a, but I have chosen this spelling, Shia, and I have stayed with it. I have 
employed the term Shia without distinguishing between the word as a noun and an 
adjective. Finally, all translations are mine unless otherwise indicated.  
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Glossary 
Ashura: the tenth day of the month of Muharram; commemoration of the martyrdom of 
Hussein in A.D. 680 
Alawi: a sect of Islam, an offshoot school of Shiism 
Ayatollah: high ranking cleric, meaning “the sign of God.” 
Ba’athist: belong to the Ba’ath party in Iraq 
Caliph: the title for the ruler of the Islamic Ummah, a successor of Mohammed 
Faqih: Islamic jurist, an educated cleric with an experience on religious law 
Fatwa: religious pronouncement 
Hajj: pilgrimage, one of the five pillars of Islam, during which Muslims go to Mecca 
Hussainiyyat: Shia mourning houses, a community center for Shia, a mosque for Shia. 
Ibadhi: Islamic school that is widely existed in Oman 
Iftar: the meal when Muslims break their fast in the month of Ramadan 
Jihad: means in Arabic “struggle,” used in the sense of holy war against infidels 
Imam: one of the twelve recognized hereditary successors of the prophet Mohammed 
 in Twelver Shia Islam. In Sunni Islam, the person who leads the prayers 
Om Al-Moemeneen: a title given to Prophet Mohammed’s wives. 
Rafidah: derogatory term for Shia referred to them as rejecters who “refuse the 
legitimacy of the Sunni Caliphs 
Majlis: meeting, parliament 
Sharia: religious law 
Ulama: clergy 
Ummah: Arabic word meaning “nation” or “community;” usually refers to the collective   
community of Muslim believers 
Walit al-Faqih: guardianship of the Islamic jurist 
x
Disclaimer 
Twelver’s branch of Shia: In my thesis, I will focus on the mainstream of Shia Islam, 
the Twelver’s branch of Shia Muslims who believe in a line of twelve imams stretching 
from Ali to the twelve one (the Mahdi) who went on a state of occultation and he is 
expected to return one day in the last days of earth. Although there are different Shia 
subgroups, they all continue to share the belief in infallible imams, and the last Imam did 
not die but went into ‘occultation’ only to reappear at the end of times.  
The definition of the Middle East: There are many terms to refer to the Middle East 
region, such as Near East, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and the Greater 
Middle East. The Middle East that I mean in the scope of this thesis refers to the territory 
of southwest Asia and North Africa (see Figure 1).  
The Persian Gulf: Is the shallow marginal sea of the Indian Ocean that lies between the 
Arabian Peninsula and southwestern Iran (see Figure 1). In the last decades, there is a dis-
pute and controversy, especially in the Arab world, over the name of the Persian Gulf, 
which is commonly used in the western media, maps, scientific, geographic societies, and 
academic works. This term is rarely used in the Arab world as it reflects the hegemony of 
Iran, and it comes against Arab nationalism, which is competing with the Persian identity.  
In the context of my thesis, I use both terms interchangeably as there are some quotes that 
contain one of the terms.  
xi 
Arab uprisings:  There is a controversy over naming the demonstrations that swept some 
countries in the Middle East as revolutions or uprisings, and whether to name these 
demonstrations Arab Spring or not. In this thesis, I use the terms Arab uprisings, Arab 
Spring revolutions interchangeably. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background: Deciding on the topic 
The Middle East region is of great importance due to its civilizations, diversity of 
cultures, geopolitical and geographic location, and availability of natural resources. 
Recently, this region has grabbed attention as an area of conflicts and a source of instability, 
failing governance structures and government services, rising extremism and sectarianism, 
the rise of non-state actors, high youth unemployment, the prolonged conflicts in Iraq, Iran, 
Syria, Palestine, and Yemen, and other threats facing the region. Also, there are many other 
factors that have impacted how things are going in this region, such as colonization, the 
Cold War, post 9/11, the 2011 wave of Arab uprisings, and many internal and external 
forces. In the recent decades, there has been a confrontation in the Middle East between 
Sunni and Shia Muslims, and many questions remain unanswered, such as what happened 
that transformed the relations between both sects toward conflict, and how to get out of the 
current situation and bring stability and coexistence to the relationships in the region. 
The idea for this research was born in 2015, even before starting my graduate degree 
in September 2017, when I was participating in a leadership program in the United States. 
During this program, I was invited with other students to an iftar in the holy month of 
Ramadan in a mosque in Portland. When I arrived at the mosque, I figured out that it was 
a Shia Mosque. I was shocked by this fact, and I had to make up an excuse to my friends 
to leave immediately. During this situation, I remembered only what resonated in my mind 
when I used to hear the word “Shia.” Although I was 22 years old, I remembered the voice 
of the Imam of the Friday prayer when he always warned us against Shia and designated 
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them as enemies of Islam, who curse the prophet’s companions and his wife, Aisha, who 
is considered a mother for all believers, Om Al-Moemeneen, as mentioned in the Holy 
Quran (Qur’an 33:6). I forgot this situation although I had a hard time justifying my 
decision to leave for my other colleagues, some of them were Shia from Iraq and Kuwait. 
The other perspective in my relation to the Sunni-Shia context is the requests I always 
receive on Facebook to vote against renaming the Arabic Gulf to the Persian Gulf. 
Another situation that motivated my research interest is my working experience in 
the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, where I lived and worked between Dammam, Al- 
Ahsa, Awamaya, and Al- Qatif, for nearly three years, where the majority of Saudi-Shia 
Muslims live, so my manager and most of the people I dealt with were Shia Muslims. On 
my first day in this job, a Sunni colleague talked to me in private and introduced me to the 
fact that we were in a company owned by a Shia Muslim, so keep religious issues out of 
conversations. Moreover, besides dozens of daily situations of Sunni-Shia interactions, I 
noticed that my Shia manager used to close his office door when he was praying, and 
sometimes he refused business deal from a customer whose name was Yazid, to which he 
seemed allergic. Furthermore, I witnessed the attacks on Shia mosques and the deadly 
attacks targeting mosques in May 2015 in Qatif and Dammam. Also, I witnessed the 
demonstrations and tensions following the execution of the prominent Shia cleric Sheikh 
Nimr al-Nimr in January 2016.  
As a native of the Middle East region, I am aware of the polarization and the 
escalation of this problem and how it affects not only the region but also many different 
parts of the world. Finally, my personal experience living in Egypt, a majority Sunni- 
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Muslim country, and in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, with a majority of Shia 
Muslims, introduced me to different narratives and sparked my research interests to 
investigate this complex topic and brought so many questions to my mind about religious 
nationalism and the use of religion by politicians.   
In an attempt to understand the situation in the Middle East, I shifted my career and 
started a master’s degree in Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies in which I took many 
classes, such as Nationalism and Ethnic Conflicts, Conflict Analysis for Resolution and 
Negotiations and Mediation, Dialogue across differences, the psychology of Conflict 
Resolution, and other relevant classes that provided me with the framework to analyze this 
conflict from multidisciplinary approaches.  
Those experiences have given me a personal agenda that guides my research 
interest. The recent sectarian tensions have preoccupied me ever since, and I began to ask 
myself, as a Muslim and a researcher, whether Islam is inherently violent or not. How could 
I read the Holy Quran every day, a book which is full of mercy and peace, and have different 
interpretations of the verses? The need for further understanding of conflicts in the Middle 
East is essential, so we can explore ways to deal with them and contain or prevent the 
killing in the name of God. 
1.2 The necessity of the study  
It is worthwhile to examine the sectarian violence in the Middle East for many 
reasons. The first reason is the sheer number of killings. In the post-9/11 war on terror, 
according to Crawford (2018), the estimated total direct death toll from the U.S. wars in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan is at least 480,000- 507,000 people, more than 244,000 of 
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them civilians and hundreds of humanitarian workers and journalists. In addition, there are 
millions of indirect deaths, resulting from disease and displacement.  
Also, according to Brown University’s Costs of War Project (2017), the U.S. 
government has spent more than five trillion dollars on military efforts to stabilize 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria in the post-9/11 wars. Moreover, in 2014, Pew 
Research Center concluded in a report titled, “Religious Hostilities Reach Six-Year High” 
that the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) was the most common region that 
experienced sectarian violence. 
Furthermore, the region’s conflicts continue to destabilize economies, devastate the 
local populations, and influence the stability of other parts of the world. The current 
emergence of fundamentalist groups in the Middle East represents a security threat to other 
parts of the world, such as the United States and Europe. The Middle East represents a hub 
to export terrorism to other places in the world. This is evidenced by the terrorist attacks 
that hit Belgium in 2015, Spain in 2004, France in 2015 and 2017, and the United Kingdom 
in 2005 and 2017. 
Another dimension about the Middle East is the sacred geography of all the three 
world religions that began there, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. There is perhaps no other 
region in the world that has drawn the continued attention of the world community as much 
as the Middle East, especially among the adherents of the three monotheistic religions: 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Finally, the stability in the Middle East is crucial to secure 
the oil exportation and global trade routes that connect the east to the west. This thesis 
provides a comprehensive explanation of the sectarian conflicts in the Middle East, which 
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could help decision-makers understand the dynamics of the region and work towards its 
stability. 
1.3 Scope and organization of the thesis 
This paper provides a precise analysis of the current state of sectarian violence in 
the Middle East, including challenges and opportunities, with future possibilities and 
perspectives to move forward to a peaceful region. 
In my research, a literature review, which aims to synthesize contributions from a 
variety of academic disciplines, is organized into several sections. My thesis begins with 
an analysis of the Sunni-Shia conflict in order to create a theoretical framework of the 
relations in this region and subsequently focuses on the religious dimension of the conflict. 
The literature, I chose to review, derives from the religious ideology of both Sunni and 
Shia and the perspectives of other scholars. This literature includes the examination of both 
sects (Sunni- Shia), their narrative, how their religious ideology connects to nationalism, 
and how they incorporate their fundamentalism into an approach to the conflict, including 
the use of violence. More specifically, the research examines the roots of the divide, his-
torical triggers, and the external players. In addition, I address what happened during the 
Iraq invasion and post 9/11. In brief, my literature review focuses on the case study of 
Saudi-Iranian relations (the general history and the development of relations in the after-
math of 9/11) and how this case relates to the study of Conflict Resolution. 
 Moreover, this thesis examines the rise of sectarian violence in the Middle East in 
the last four decades, where political interests are tied to religion. The analysis focuses on 
the development of Saudi-Iranian relations as a case study. Also, this study aims to produce 
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knowledge and build meaning on the current state of affairs in the Middle East and how 
sectarian violence impacts the identity of the Middle East citizens and shapes a new reality 
in the region. Finally, the last section of this thesis offers some perspectives to deal with 
the current situation and move forward in a peaceful direction using Peace Studies and 
Conflict Resolution theories. 
1.4 Problem statement 
This thesis focuses on the factors that have escalated the relationship between  
Sunni and Shia into violence and the role played by Saudi Arabia and Iran in the conflict 
between Sunni and Shia Muslims in the Middle East region during the last four decades. 
1.5 Research questions 
Throughout my research, there are many central questions which guide the study, 
such as: 
 What factors have contributed to transforming the Saudi (Sunni)-Iranian (Shia) re-
lationships into lethal conflicts in the Middle East region in the last four decades?
 What are pertaining factors, including the rule of government, the global actors in
the region, ideology, economic interests, etc., that contributed to the escalation of
the conflict?
 What is the role of religion in motivating and legitimating acts of violence?
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
2.1 Research method 
Given the complexity of the subject matter in this research and the number of 
research questions it raises, this research uses a qualitative and interpretive approach. It is 
based on the critical review of existing literature from a variety of academic fields, 
including but not limited to peace and conflict studies, politics, international relations, 
theology, history, security and terrorism studies, and social psychology. Besides, the 
analysis of scholars, political figures, religious leaders, and the press. 
Leavy (2017) explains that qualitative research is an inductive approach to build 
knowledge and generate meanings, especially in my topic where there is a need to 
investigate and unpack the meanings, situations, and events to build a depth of 
understanding about some dimension of social life. Also, the qualitative researcher uses 
content analysis to understand the meanings that circulate in texts and makes 
interpretations of the data and get the sense of the big picture. 
Given the complexity of this research, this thesis uses the case study approach as 
an analytical approach to help the readers understand the conflict. George and Bennett 
(2005) define the case study approach as “a well- defined aspect of a historical episode to 
develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events by 
assessing complex relations, such as tipping points” (p. 5). Also, the case study allows the 
reader to be aware of the different socio-economic and historical contexts of the conflict. 
In addition, it identifies some of critical features and examines if and how the features 
intersect with each other.  
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Moreover, Bhattacherjee (2012) highlights the importance of case research in 
giving more contextualized, and more authentic interpretation of the phenomenon of 
interest than most other research methods. Also, the case study research approach offers 
multiple levels of analysis to the phenomenon of interest, particularly in complex relations, 
where there are multiple participants and interacting sequences of events (pp. 93–94). 
Finally, it is essential to select a case study that is relevant to the research. This 
study examines the sectarian violence in the Middle East and how authoritarian regimes in 
the Middle East manage to consolidate power. This thesis offers a structured-focus 
comparison and rigorous exploration of the Saudi-Iranian relation transitions after certain 
milestones in the history of the relationships with a specific focus on the proxy wars that 
emerged in response to sectarian narratives in the post 9/11. This study explores the case 
of the Saudi-Iranian relationships in theoretical frameworks where central concepts, 
political and religious grievances, hostile interactions between political groups, and 
competition for power are discussed.  
2.2 Theoretical framework 
This research uses a conflict analysis framework developed by Matthew Levinger 
in his book; Conflict Analysis: Understanding Causes, Unlocking solutions in 2013. The 
framework includes a conflict assessment framework, conflict mapping, and stakeholder 
analysis in a way to understand the multi-dimensions of the conflict and develop effective 
peacebuilding strategies. Levinger (2013) identifies conflict assessment frameworks as 
“qualitative analytical tools to help forge a shared set of questions about the nature and 
potential trajectory of conflict and a shared vocabulary with which to discuss opportunities 
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for preventive actions” (p. 87). Also, he mentions that this framework provides an 
understanding of the area of consensus and critical disagreements. 
Through this framework, the strategic, political, socio-economic, cultural, and 
psychological dimensions of the conflicts will be introduced with emphasis on the case 
study of this research, and it is supported by theories from different knowledge areas. Also, 
this research introduces the narratives of conflict’s stakeholders, Sunni and Shia Muslims, 
to gain insights into the conflict from both perspectives. Moreover, conflict mapping 
presents a graphical representation, which focuses on actors, their interrelationships, and 
the various dimensions of the conflict as a way to simplify the complexity of the conflict 
and to help anticipate the possible steps within the conflict.  
Part of the framework is the stakeholders’ analysis, which is an integral part of this 
research. Grimble and Wellard (1997) mention that stakeholders might include individuals, 
groups, organizations, institutions, societies, policymakers, government officials, 
businesses, companies, future generations, and the national interest. Also, the World Bank 
Group (n. d.) highlights the importance of understanding and analyzing each stakeholder’s 
position, the power or the level of influence, the level of interest, and the affiliation of the 
group. Moreover, stakeholder analysis is beneficial to policymakers who can use it to 
identify key actors and to assess their knowledge, interests, positions, alliances, and 
importance related to the policy. 
Finally, Levinger (2013) identifies conflict mapping tool as “a graphical 
representation of various dimensions of a conflict that seeks to illuminate a conflict’s 
dynamics, evolution, and scope” (p. 135). Moreover, a conflict map helps the reader 
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visualize the dynamics of the conflict through synthesizing information and identifying the 
main actors among the system. There are different types of conflict mapping techniques 
such as geospatial mapping, temporal mapping, and relational mapping, but I use the 
relational mapping in this thesis.   
2.3 Limitations of research 
Regarding the methodology of this research, George and Bennett (2005) identify 
the limitations of a case studies approach, such as bias. Bias is evident when researchers 
sometimes deliberately choose cases that share a particular outcome to prove their theory 
and argument. Moreover, regarding the stakeholder analysis, my research is limited by the 
timeframe when writing this thesis. Stakeholder analysis should be done regularly as the 
stakeholders’ power and interest may change quickly, or the number of stakeholders may 
change. Also, Ambler and Wilson (1995) highlight some other limitations associated with 
the stakeholder theory, such as determining the stakeholder, confusion of the purpose, or 
measure the stake. 
Furthermore, Bhattacherjee (2012) mentions that qualitative analysis depends on 
the skills, experiences, and knowledge of the researchers. The more the researcher is aware 
of the context of the data, the more the researcher could produce better work. With this 
point in mind, my analysis and conclusions are not entirely neutral even if I recognize all 
expressed interests, values, and concerns as legitimate. 
There are other limitations. First of all, most of the Muslim sources related to 
Conflict Resolution are written in Arabic, and it is hard to translate the Arabic texts to 
English and keep the same meaning, although I am a native Arabic speaker. As a result, I 
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depend on professional translations of the texts. Also, there are time constraints of this 
thesis because such research needs a much deeper understanding of the problem. Another 
limitation of this study is that I am not a speaker of Farsi, and considering that many sources 
on the Shia Muslims are in Persian, so I depend on professional translations and Persian 
authors who are fluent in English. Finally, as a Sunni Muslim, I may have a bias towards 
one sect when doing the analysis, so I follow the framework, methodology, and introduce 


















Chapter 3: Literature Review 
For the comprehensive literature review, I locate the existing scholarly works into 
three categories. First, a brief historical overview of the divide and the development of 
relations between Sunni and Shia Muslims will be introduced. I focus on the last four 
decades, starting in 1979, which marks the Iranian Revolution. Second, I analyze the 
relationship between religion and violence. Third, I elaborate on the case study of my thesis, 
the Saudi- Iranian relationships. Also, I incorporate the Conflict Resolution and 
international relations literature with many theories that cover the interdisciplinary 
approach of my thesis and explain each side’s narratives, how their narratives connect to 
nationalism, and how each side incorporates religious identity into their politics. 
3.1 Historical background on Sunni and Shia Islam 
To understand the intractable conflicts in the Middle East, particularly the sectarian 
violence between Shia and Sunni Muslims, we need to look back to history and the 
development of relations between both sects. The next few pages illuminate some of the 
brief historical dimensions and focus on some specific points for the sake of the scope of 
this thesis. 
In brief, the divide between Sunni and Shia Muslims goes back to the seventh 
century, when the Prophet Mohammed died in A.D. 632 without appointing a successor or 
informing the Muslim community about the process of choosing a successor. At that time, 
the Muslim community divided into two groups over the leadership of the nascent Muslim 
nation. On the one hand, one group claimed that the successor of the prophet should be 
elected from among the prophet’s companions, so based on this opinion, this group elected 
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Abu Bakr, a close friend, advisor, and father-in-law to the prophet, to become the first 
successor or Caliph of the Muslim nation. On the other hand, a second group claimed that 
the successor of the prophet should be from his bloodline, so this group thought that Ali, 
the prophet’s cousin and his son-in-law, should be the Caliph (Halm, 2007; Hazleton, 2010; 
Haider, 2014; Hashemi & Postel, 2017; Momen, 1985). The first group now is called Sunni. 
The word "Sunni" in Arabic means one who follows the traditions of the Prophet. The 
second group is called "Shia," which means in Arabic, a group, or a supportive party of 
people or partisans. Also, Blanchard (2009) and Hiro (2018) highlight another dimension 
to the claim of the Shia group as this group believed that the Prophet Mohammad himself 
had named Ali as successor, so electing Abu Bakr was a violation of divine order. 
Over the years, the first Caliph was Abu Bakr, followed by Umar, and then Othman. 
Ali finally became Caliph in A.D. 656, but he was assassinated five years later in Kufa, in 
present-day southern Iraq, in AD 661. After Ali’s death and the establishment of the 
Umayyad caliphate in Damascus, his partisans in Kufa encouraged his son Hussein to 
challenge the Umayyad caliphate, which was established after Ali’s death in Damascus, so 
in response to this call, Hussein who was residing in Mecca, headed to Kufa to lead the 
revolt against the “tyrannical and immoral” Umayyad Caliph, Yazid. Hussein never 
reached Kufa; instead, he and his small group of followers were intercepted at Karbala, in 
present-day Iraq, by the Caliph Yazid’s forces. The people of Kufa broke their promise to 
support Hussein, and he was killed along with most of his family and companions at the 
Battle of Karbala in 680 (Hazleton, 2010; Halm, 2007; Haider, 2014; Hiro, 2018; Momen, 
1985; Nakash, 2006). Many scholars shed light on the significance of the Battle of Karbala 
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and the martyrdom of Hussein, which represents a milestone in Shia history and is a turning 
point in the relationship between Shia and Sunni. According to Hiro (2018) and Halm 
(2007), Karbala and the symbolism of Hussein's death represent a symbol of justice, 
religious devotion, and spiritual power for Shias.  
Over time, each sect has developed different rituals and traditions. Although Sunni 
and Shia Muslims differ in rituals and interpretation of Islamic law, both sects share the 
most fundamental Islamic beliefs and the main articles of Islam. Both sects believe in one 
God, follow the same prophet, and recite the same holy book, The Quran, give money to 
the poor, fast during the holy month of Ramadan, and performing the pilgrimage to Mecca 
(Hiro, 2018; Hazleton, 2010; Halm, 2007; Haider, 2014; Momen, 1985). 
Another point in the comparison between both sects is their view of leadership. The 
Imam in Shia Islam is infallible and has the political and religious leadership of the 
community, unlike Sunni Islam that separates between religious and political leadership. 
Moreover, Shia Muslims choose to follow a line of Imams, which they believe have been 
appointed by the Prophet Mohammad or God Himself, so Shia Muslims do not recognize 
the authority of elected Muslim leaders (Dodge, 2019). Understanding the belief systems 
of both sects and understanding how each sect perceives the leaders of their communities, 
whether states or other levels of governments, are crucial in this thesis.  
 Nowadays, according to Pew Research Center’s estimates in 2009, Muslims’ 
population is about 1.6 billion Muslims, and the Sunni Muslims make up the majority (87-
90%) of Muslims all over the world while 10-13% are Shias. Significant populations of 
Shia Muslims are in Iran and Iraq, and significant minority communities in Yemen, Bahrain, 
15 
 
Syria, and Lebanon. It is hard to distinguish Sunni from Shia Muslims. Nakash (1994) 
mentions that the two sects have lived at peace more than in conflict. For centuries, Sunnis 
and Shias have lived together peacefully, intermarried, prayed at the same mosques, and 
cooperated over the years. For example, according to Gelvin (2018), at the time of the 
United States’ invasion of Iraq, marriage between both sects represented approximately 30 
percent of all marriages in Iraq. 
The historical literature shows many examples of sectarian cooperation. During the 
Sunni Abbasid Dynasty (750 CE-1258 CE), which is considered by many historians as the 
“Golden Age” of Islam, Sunni rulers relied on the Shia support to establish their empires. 
Moreover, Nakash (1994) gives more examples of the cooperation between Sunnis and 
Shias against common enemies, such as European crusaders or Mongols. Furthermore, he 
emphasizes with another case study on Muslim unity and the jihad movement against the 
European penetration of the Iranian and Ottoman territories in the late nineteenth century 
and the beginning of the twentieth century.  
Dr. Carool Kersten, in an interview with Live Encounters Magazine in 2014, 
highlights another example of sectarian cooperation during the Abbasid Caliphate in 
Baghdad, in which Shia ministers assisted the Sunni Caliphs, such as the Buwayhid family, 
who were essential patrons and sponsors of learning and culture at the court. Moreover, 
South Asia has witnessed the simultaneous presence of Sunni Mughal Sultans in Delhi and 
their semi-autonomous Shia vassals in nearby Lucknow.  Also, Lipka (2014) mentions that 
most Muslims do not identify themselves by affiliation to a specific sect and they do not 
even see the distinction between Sunni and Shia Islam as relevant; instead, they prefer to 
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call themselves “Muslims” as is the case in Kazakhstan and Indonesia. 
Recently, Sunnis and Shias have united together in specific periods. For example, 
Kirmanj (2013) highlights significant events in the course of relations between both sects 
in Iraq. Both Sunnis and Shias joined in opposing the British mandate over Iraq in the1920s, 
and there were signs of cooperation, such as attending each other’s religious ceremonies. 
Shias attended Sunni’s celebrations of the birth of the Prophet Mohammed, and the Sunnis 
attended the commemoration of the killing of Imam Hussein. Also, Gettleman (2004) 
mentions another example of sectarian cooperation during the U.S. invasion to Iraq in 2003 
when both sects condemned the invasion and formed armed groups to fight the U.S.-led 
coalition forces. 
3.2 Saudi Arabia and Iran  
Although there are many Sunni-majority and Shia-majority countries in the Middle 
East, this study focuses on Saudi Arabia as the representative case of Sunni Islam and Iran 
as the case of Shia Islam. Both countries offer a valuable case study for this research. Hiro 
(2018), Nasr (2007), and Nakash (2006) explain the common factor between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran is their claim to exceptionalism and their battle for the leadership of Muslim 
Ummah.  As evidence, in Saudi Arabia, the king's official title is the “Custodian of the Two 
Holy Mosques,” and the official name of Iran is the “Islamic Republic of Iran.” In addition, 
both countries have strong leadership and reliable apparatus. Finally, both countries have 
a history of supporting non-state actors in other countries. The next few pages provide a 




3.2.1 The Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) 
Iran, which was historically known as Persia until 1935, has traditionally been a 
significant power in the Middle East region. Iran is a country of rich civilizations, culture, 
natural resources, and strategic geographic location. It locates on the Persian Gulf and Strait 
of Hormuz, which are vital maritime pathways for crude oil transport and world energy 
supplies (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2019).  
In 1979, conservative clerical forces led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini toppled 
the monarchy and established a theocratic system of government with the ultimate political 
authority vested in a learned religious scholar referred to commonly as the Supreme Leader 
(CIA, 2019). Iran has a complex political system (see Figure 4). The U.S. Department of 
State’s report on Human Rights and Labor (2018) explains that the supreme leader holds 
constitutional authority over the whole country. He has authority over the judiciary, gov-
ernment-run media, armed forces, and indirectly controls internal security forces and vital 
institutions. When it comes to the army, defense issues, and foreign policy, the supreme 
leader is the one who decides on these issues. According to the Central Intelligence Agency 
(2019), Iran’s population is 83,024,745 (July 2018 est.), and it has the second largest pop-
ulation of the region after Egypt (The World Bank Group, 2015). Iran contains a diversity 
of ethnic groups, such as Persian, Azeri, Kurd, Lur, Baloch, Arab, Turkmen, and Turkic 
tribes. In addition to the diverse ethnic groups, Iran has many religious groups, such as 
Muslims (official) 99.4% (Shia 90-95%, Sunni 5-10%), other (includes Zoroastrian, Jew-
ish, and Christian) 0.3%, unspecified 0.4% (2011 est.) (CIA, 2019). Article 12, in chapter 
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one of the Iranian constitution, states that Shia Twelver school is the official religion in 
Iran.  
According to the Iranian constitution, the role of the supreme leader is based on the 
ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini. The supreme leader is at the top of Iran's political power 
structure. Another component of the Iranian political system is the Guardian Council, 
which is the most influential body in Iran. BBC News' guide (2009) explains in detail how 
the Guardian Council works. It consists of six theologians appointed by the supreme leader 
and six jurists nominated by the judiciary and approved by Majlis. The Assembly of Ex-
perts is responsible for appointing the supreme leader, monitoring his performance, and 
"removing him if he is deemed incapable of fulfilling his duties" (Rose, 2016, para. 8). The 
290 members of the Majlis, or parliament, are elected by popular vote every four years. 
The Majlis has the power to introduce and pass laws, approve the country's budget, sum-
mon and impeach ministers or the president. However, the conservative guardian council 
must approve all Majlis bills. The president, who is the second-highest-ranking official in 
Iran, chooses the members of the cabinet or Council of Ministers, and Majlis must approve 
them. The president is elected for four years and can serve no more than two consecutive 
terms. The constitution describes him as the second-highest-ranking official in the country. 
As the head of the executive branch of power, the president is responsible for ensuring the 
constitution is implemented and representing the country internationally. 
From the economic perspective, Cordesman (2018) explains the economic situation 
in Iran. Also, the CIA World Factbook summarizes that "Iran's economy is marked by stat-
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ist policies, inefficiencies, and reliance on oil and gas exports, but Iran also possesses sig-
nificant agricultural, industrial, and service sectors" (as cited in Cordesman, 2018, p. 9). 
According to Chapter Four in the Iranian constitution, Article 44, “The Islamic Republic is 
not a communist state as the Islamic scholars fiercely oppose this." All large-scale and 
mother industries, foreign trade, significant minerals, banking, insurance, power generation, 
dams, and large-scale irrigation networks, radio and television, post, telegraph and tele-
phone services, aviation, shipping, roads, railroads and the like" are entirely owned by the 
government.  
According to the World Bank's overview of Iran in 2018, Iran is the second-largest 
economy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region after Saudi Arabia. Also, 
"Iran ranks second in the world in natural gas reserves and fourth in proven crude oil re-
serves. Economic activity and government revenues still depend to a large extent on oil 
revenues and therefore remain volatile" (The World Bank, 2018, para. 1). However, ac-
cording to the Central Intelligence Agency (2019), deteriorating economic conditions in 
Iran are due primarily to government mismanagement and international sanctions, but 
Iran's internal security situation remains stable.  
3.2.2 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia or the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is named after the ruling Al Saud 
family, which came to power in the 18th century. It lies in the Middle East, bordering the 
Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, north of Yemen (see Figure 2). It is an important country 
because of its resources and unique political, economic, and social affairs. Saudi Arabia is 
also the birthplace of Islam and home to Islam's two holiest mosques in Mecca and Medina. 
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In 1932, Abd Al-Aziz bin Abd al-Rahman Al Saud (Ibn Saud) founded the modern Saudi 
state after a 30-year campaign to unify most of the Arabian Peninsula (CIA, 2019; Al-
Rasheed, 2010). According to the World Bank (2019), the Population of Saudi Arabia in 
2018 is 33,699,947. The population consists of 90% Arab and 10% Afro-Asian and Muslim 
citizens. Sunni Muslims represent 85-90% of Muslim citizens, while 10-15% are Shia 
(CIA, 2019). 
Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy (see Figure 5). According to the fundamental 
law of Saudi Arabia, adopted by royal decree in 1992, the king must comply with Sharia 
(Islamic law), the Quran, and the Sunnah (the traditions of Prophet Mohammed). All of the 
above are declared to be the country's constitution. There are no national elections and 
political parties, but it is worthy of mentioning that the government held its first-ever 
elections in 2005 and 2011, when Saudis went to the polls to elect municipal councilors. 
The king, who should be one of the founder’s male descendants, rules the country, 
combining legislative, executive, judicial functions, and royal decrees, which form the 
basis of the country's legislation. The king is also the prime minister and presides over the 
Council of Ministers of Saudi Arabia and the Consultative Assembly of Saudi Arabia (CIA, 
2019; Al-Rasheed, 2010). 
From the economic perspective, it is a rich country with natural resources such as 
petroleum, natural gas, iron, gold, and copper. Saudi Arabia has an oil-based economy with 
strong government controls over major economic activities. It possesses about 16% of the 
world's proven petroleum reserves, ranks as the largest exporter of petroleum, and plays a 
leading role in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The 
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petroleum sector accounts for roughly 87% of budget revenues, 42% of GDP, and 90% of 
export earnings (CIA, 2019). 
3.2.3 The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
Wehrey, Karasik, Nader, Ghez, and Hansell (2009) argue that the relationship between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran ebbs and flows, and it ranges from tension to accommodation when 
dealing with regional orders. Many scholars describe bilateral relationships as a cold war 
(Gause, 2014; Hiro, 2018; Hashemi & Postel, 2017). Moreover, Gelvin (2018) argues that 
the animosity is political, not religious, as both countries have different governance 
systems and survival goals.  
Before the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Hashemi (2019), in an interview with Fair 
Observer, highlights that both Iran and Saudi Arabia were pro-Western monarchies with 
good relations. Hiro (2018), Mabon (2016), and Teitelbaum (2013) mention that both 
countries shared the United States security umbrella as part of the anti-Soviet policy “Twin 
Pillar policy,” in which both countries were able to acquire billions of dollars of the most 
advanced arms during the 1970s. Also, Gelvin (2018) argues that autocrats in Iran and 
Saudi Arabia benefited from British support in the last century. Hashemi (2019) gives 
another example of cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia during the civil war in 
Yemen in the 1960s when both countries supported the Zaydi Shia against the republican 
forces backed by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. 
All of the previous examples of cooperation changed after 1979 when the Saudis 
and their allies worried about the Iranian Revolution and started playing the sectarian card. 
Even though King Khalid, the ruler of Saudi Arabia at that time, sent the leader of the 
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Islamic Revolution, Khomeini, a congratulatory message after the revolution, stating the 
importance of Islamic solidarity as the basis for closer relations of the two countries 
(Hussein, 2012). Also, King Fahd, the Saudi Prime Minister, expressed no public alarm, 
stating that “what was happening in Iran was a domestic problem that was best left to 
Iranian to resolve” (Hiro, 2018, p. 63). Shortly, Khomeini started to talk about exporting 
the revolution to other Islamic countries, sharing his interpretation of legitimacy regarding 
Islamic governance, and his critique of monarchies, Saudi Arabia, among other Gulf 
monarchies, started to be concerned.  
From 1980-1988, the Iraq-Iran war took place. Iraq received massive financial 
support from Saudi Arabia. Also, Saudi weakened Iran’s economy during the war by 
flooding the oil market, which caused a decrease in oil price from $28 to $10 a barrel by 
July 1986 (Hiro, 2018). Saudi Arabia also granted permission for Iraqi aircrafts to be 
stationed at Saudi airbases (Fürtig, 2007), and Saudi jet fighters shot down two Iranian jets 
in 1984 (Gause, 2014). During the same period, both countries started a proxy war in 
Pakistan, where Saudi Arabia backed the Islamization drive in Pakistan by Sunni General 
Zia al- Haq, who was against Shia. Some riots resulted in the assassination of the Iranian 
consul general in Lahore in 1990 besides assassination against sectarian leaders (Hiro, 
2018). Marschall (2003) highlights a key event in the bilateral relationship when Iranian 
pilgrims gathered in Mecca on 31 July 1987, chanting “Death to America” and holding 
portraits of Khomeini. The situation escalated when Saudi security forces arrived and left 
over 400 Shia pilgrims dead. Following this incident, Khomeini increased his criticism and 
efforts to overthrow the Saudi regime. 
23 
 
  In the 1990s, there were short periods of warm relations, a reduction of regional 
tensions, and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations under the reformists' presidencies 
of Akbar Hashmi Rafsanjani and President Mohammed Khatami, who made reciprocal 
visits to Saudi Arabia during this period. Also, the animosity toward Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, 
who in 1990 invaded Kuwait, helped bring the two sides together (Gause, 2014; Kinzer, 
2011). During Khatami’s presidency, there were mutual agreements and discussions 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran regarding Afghanistan, oil production quotas, and defense 
issues (Kechichian, 2000). 
In the 2000s, the critical event was the American invasion and occupation of Iraq, 
followed by the rise of Shia political parties with close ties to Iran (Hashemi, 2019). Nasr 
(2007) highlights that the American Invasion of Iraq changed the regional balance of power 
in the Middle East, causing the Saudis to panic. Simultaneously, the rise and growing 
prestige of the Shia militia of Hezbollah in Lebanon, that expelled Israel from southern 
Lebanon in 2006, resulted in its growing popularity among Sunni Arabs. Another 
significant milestone in this period was the election of hardliner Ahmadinejad in 2005. 
During his period, relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia steadily deteriorated. 
Recently, the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings damaged these relationships further. In 
Syria, Saudi Arabia supported the ousting of Syrian President Bashar al Assad, who is 
supported by Iran. In Yemen, the Zaidi Shia captured the Yemeni capital and expelled the 
Sunni President, Abd Rabbu Mansur Hadi, in 2014, so that Saudi Arabia led a military 
coalition to fight Houthi- Shia militia backed by Iran.  
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In September 2015, more than 400 Iranian pilgrims died during Hajj stampede near 
Mecca (Hubbard, 2015). Following this event, Iran accused Saudi Arabia of incompetence 
and called for an international Islamic fact-finding committee. In January 2016, the 
execution of the Shia religious leader, Nimr al Nimr, in Saudi Arabia, was followed by 
ransacking the Saudi Arabian embassy in Tehran and the Saudi consulate in Mashhad. Soon 
after, Saudi Arabia and five other countries cut diplomatic relations with Iran. 
3.3 Supporting theories 
The field of Conflict Resolution is an interdisciplinary field that covers a variety of 
approaches to resolving conflicts. It draws upon international relations, psychology, 
sociology, theology, political science, among other disciplines. This section covers and 
defines the main theories in my analysis. 
3.3.1 The Harvard Approach of Negotiations   
The Harvard principle is a negotiation technique. It was developed at Harvard 
University by Professors Roger Fisher and William Ury (2011) in their book on 
negotiations entitled “Getting to yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In.” This 
approach identifies the difference between the two commonly used terms by conflict 
practitioners and negotiators: positions and interests. In brief, positions are what people say 
they want, but interests are why people want what they say they want.  
This approach highlights the importance of focusing interests instead of positions, 
and developing a jointly accepted framework to solve the conflict (Mason & Rychard, 
2005). The approach has four pillars. First, separating the people from the problem subject 
to negotiation. Second, focusing on the interests of the parties involved, not on the positions. 
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Third, generating different options for mutual gain. Fourth, basing the agreement reached 
on objective criteria. Also, Roger Fisher and William Ury have developed the concept of 
BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). This concept refers to the best 
alternative that we can possibly have when facing a negotiated agreement.  
3.3.2 The Human Needs Theory  
Human Needs Theory proposes that all humans have specific basic universal needs, 
such as safety, identity, and social security. When these needs are not satisfied, conflict is 
likely to occur. From the Conflict Resolution standpoint, aggressions and conflicts are a 
result of institutions and social norms that are incompatible with inherent human needs. 
Also, this theory asserts that personal recognition and identity are essential parts of 
individuals. Moreover, this theory highlights that humans are not so malleable to be 
deprived of their needs for the good of a system as when these needs are neglected, 
individuals will seek them out, and that may cause ethnic wars.  
Finally, this theory sheds light on the broad definition of the conflicts. Conflicts 
have been defined by physical terms (for example, territory, workers strike, divorce) but 
tend to disregard human values and non-material needs that are a part of these conflicts 
(such as; unfair treatment and lack of recognition).  
 3.3.3 The Conflict Transformation Approach  
According to John Paul Lederach (2014), “conflict transformation is to envision 
and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating 
constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction 
and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships” (p. 22). 
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Lederach (2014) argues that the conflict transformation approach sees conflicts as 
destructive or constructive interactions, depending on how conflicts are dealt with or 
transformed. Also, a transformational approach aims to understand the particular episode 
of conflict not in isolation, but as embedded in the greater pattern. 
Moreover, conflict transformation focuses on the dynamic aspects of social conflict 
and a view of conflict as an opportunity. Finally, conflict transformation suggests dialogue 
as a fundamental way to promote constructive change on all these levels.  
3.3.4 Negative and Positive Peace 
Johan Galtung (1996) distinguishes between negative peace and positive peace. 
Negative peace can be defined as the absence of violence and tensions. While definitions 
of positive peace include the absence of violence, peaceful cooperation between groups, 
harmony, political moderation, social justice through equal opportunity, fair distribution of 
power and resources, and equal protection and impartial enforcement of the law. 
3.3.5 Bar-Tal’s Theory of Intractable Conflict 
 Bar-Tal (2013) lists seven characteristics as inherent in intractable conflicts. They 
are total, protracted, violent, perceived as unsolvable, viewed as a zero-sum contest, central, 
and demanding great investments. Being total, such conflicts are “perceived as being about 
essential and basic goals, needs, or values that are regarded as indispensable for the group’s 
existence or survival” (Bar-Tal, 2013, p. 37). Being protracted, they have not only 
“accumulated increasing amounts of prejudice, mistrust, hatred, and animosity” but also 
evolved into “a socio-psychological infrastructure that includes collective memory, the 
ethos of conflict, and emotional orientations” (pp. 51-52). Since they are violent, they 
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escalate the conflict and are burned into society’s collective memory. “The collective 
memory of physical violence serves as a foundation for the development of a culture of 
conflict” (p. 43).  
Such conflicts are perceived as unsolvable for several reasons, including “a long 
history of failed attempts to achieve a peaceful resolution or to subdue the rival party, 
mutual delegitimizing practices by both sides, the resistance of involved societies to 
changing their conflict’s goals and making compromises, or a lack of accommodating 
leadership” (Bar-Tal, 2013, pp. 47-48). Since each side of the conflict believes it is 
unsolvable, their beliefs “often serve as a self-fulfilling prophecy, because both sides 
initiate acts of violence on the basis of this belief that provides a confirmation to the 
established belief” (p. 48). This leads into the zero-sum condition, where the parties 
perceive “any loss suffered by the other side as their gain, and conversely any gains of the 
other side as their own loss” (p. 44). The conflict becomes central to the lives of the society 
so that members of society are engaged in the conflict with their energies. 
In any conflict, Bar-Tal says that centrality is exhibited in several ways. He 
mentions that unfulfilled needs and vested interest are key motivations of conflicts, 
especially for leaders, elites, and ideologues who use the conflict for their own purposes. 
Also, some politicians promote fear and active security measures to get citizens to vote for 
them. In contrast to these negative factors, Bar-Tal mentions the positive factors of trust, 
hope, and empathy that help deescalate the conflict. Trust is one of the most crucial factors 
because it “denotes lasting expectations about future behaviors of the rival group that affect 
the welfare of one’s own group and allows taking risks in various lines of behaviors” (Bar-
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Tal, 2013, p. 340). 
Finally, Bar- Tal introduces his thoughts on ending the conflicts. Intractable conflict 
can be reduced in intensity over time if the societies involved in changing their views or 
the nature of the conflict changes. Also, he sees that change is required in leadership in 
order to solve conflicts  
3.3.6 Deterrence Theory 
Due to the enormous changes in international politics in the aftermath of the Cold 
War, there have been lengthy discussions over the viability of the deterrence theory. 
According to Barash and Webel (2018), deterrence theory is based on the idea that “nuclear 
war will be prevented by the threat that any attacker would suffer unacceptable retaliation” 
(p. 132), so no country would use nuclear weapons against the other as long as the victim 
retains the ability to cause unacceptable damage to the attacker. 
Many scholars argue that deterrence became the central resource for sustaining 
international and internal security. Morgan (2017) highlights the serious effort to reduce 
the reliance on deterrence in international politics, but it was soon replaced by severe 
movement in the opposite direction.  
3.3.7 Enemies and Allies 
Vamik D. Volkan’s political psychology approach of the “Need to Have Enemies 
and Allies” is a founding approach in Political Psychology and Conflict Resolution. Volkan 
(1985) highlights one’s need to identify some people as allies and others as enemies as a 
way to protect the sense of self, ethnicity, and nationality. When dealing with international 
conflicts, he assures the importance of grasping the psychological cogency of one's need 
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to have enemies and allies, as well as one’s stubborn adherence to identification with a 
group when undergoing hardship and danger. 
3.3.8 Galtung’s typology of violence 
 Galtung (1969; 1990) identifies three different types of violence; direct, structural, 
and cultural violence. According to Dinham and Francis (2015), Galtung’s three-pronged 
typology of violence highlights how violence occurs and functions in a community. Also, 
Galtung’s typology highlights the different factors which control the environment of vio-
lence; these factors range between cultural, historical, or both. According to Galtung 
(1969), direct violence represents any behaviors that serve to threaten life itself and/ or to 
diminish one’s capacity to meet basic human needs. Examples of this type are killing, bul-
lying, and sexual assault. Moreover, structural violence represents the systematic ways in 
which instructions play a role in preventing some groups from equal access to opportunities 
and services that enable the fulfillment of basic human needs. This definition sheds light 
on the unequal share of power to decide over the distribution of resources. Also, structural 
violence can be formal behavior, such as legal structures that enforce marginalization of 
specific groups as indicated in constitutions or laws, or it is culturally functional but with-
out a legal mandate, such as limited access to governmental positions for marginalized 
groups (Dinham, Francis, 2015).  
Furthermore, Galtung (1990) defines cultural violence as “those aspects of culture, 
the symbolic sphere of our existence, exemplified by religion and ideology, language and 
art, empirical science, and formal science (logic, mathematics) that can be used to justify 
or legitimize direct or structural violence” (p. 291). Culture symbols or icons are essential 
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to construct what Benedict Anderson (1995) calls “the imagined community” of the nation, 
but these culture symbols play an influential role in enforcing the environment of violence 
and the nationalist narrative by creating a sacred narrative and ideologies that can cause 
violence.  
3.4 Religion and violence 
Religion has assumed a critical responsibility in defining the guidelines for life in 
societies of the Middle East, and the religious texts are now under great scrutiny with their 
different interpretations and contexts, particularly after the use of these texts by fundamen-
talist groups to justify their violent acts. It is essential to explore the nexus of religion and 
violence and be aware of the conflicts with religious dimensions. By taking into consider-
ation the scope of this research, this thesis focuses on Islam, which is always associated 
with negative images, sentiments, and stereotypes by the west (Said, 1979). 
Scholars have argued that religions are the drivers of violent conflicts. Huntington 
(1996) argues that different religions would be a reason behind the conflict between civili-
zations, particularly between the Muslim and the non-Muslim world. Also, Avalos (2005) 
argues that religions are a cause of violence as they create sacred resources, such as one 
God. Munson (2011) mentions that religion is a killing tool as people throughout human 
history have killed in the name of their Gods.  
Islam’s holy scripture, the Quran, is interpreted by many rival groups in a way to 
justify sectarian violence. For example, recently, sacred spaces in Iraq have been attacked 
in intra-Muslim wars between Sunnis and Shias. Also, the Wahhabis, a Sunni school of 
thought who are supported by the ruling family of Saudi Arabia, believe that “the 
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veneration of Shias martyrs and saints is nothing more than a form of idolatry” (Avalos, 
2005, p. 261). The Wahhabis see Shias as infidels, and they use many verses from the Quran 
to justify their violence against Shias. More examples will be introduced in Chapter Four 
about the role of religion in the sectarian conflicts in the Middle East. 
3.5 The Battle of Karbala and the conflict supporting narratives 
It is crucial to understand the relationship between Sunnis and Shias from the 
perspective of one of the historical milestones, the Battle of Karbala, which is a turning 
point in the relationship between Shias and Sunnis. Bar-Tal, Oren, and Nets-Zehngut (2014) 
mention that “in every intractable conflict the rivals construct conflict supporting master 
collective narratives that focus on the conflict's entirety and that often become dominant” 
(p. 665). This explanation applies to the Battle of Karbala, which has been told and retold 
over the centuries. Aghaie (2004) mentions that the Shias use this even as the root metaphor 
upon which many of their religious beliefs and practices are based. Also, it has served as a 
vindication of the Shia cause in the face of Sunni criticism. 
Over the years, Karbala has been used by Shia Muslims in their intractable conflicts 
with Sunni Muslims. Bar-Tal et al. (2014) explain this phenomenon and highlight the use 
of conflict-supporting narratives to satisfy the basic socio-psychological needs of the 
parties involved in the conflicts. Furthermore, Bar-Tal et al. (2009) mention that this 
narrative often uses victimization of the group as a tool (as cited in Bar-Tal et al., 2014).  
Also, the functions of conflict-supportive narratives play a significant role in 
helping society members on both individual and collective levels to adapt to the harsh, 
stressful, and demanding conditions of the intractable conflict. Additionally, the narratives 
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prepare the society for threatening and violent acts by the enemy as well as for the severe 
living conditions that may encounter. Based on this explanation, the Iranian leaders justify 
the recent tough economic situation of Iran and ask combatants to join fighting in Syria. 
Similarly, Saudi Arabia asks its solider to sacrifice their lives in Yemen to fight the Shias. 
Furthermore, the Battle of Karbala sets up as part of the collective sociopolitical 













Chapter 4: Analysis 
4.1 Milestone events that have served to escalate and perpetuate sectarian conflicts 
From the previous literature, I argue that it is not a religious conflict; instead, it is 
a political conflict that continues and escalates to this moment with many implications over 
the centuries. The political power struggle between the Sunni camp, led by Saudi Arabia, 
and the Shia camp, led by Iran, has many serious consequences. In recent decades, many 
milestones shift the relationship and bring the sectarian tensions into the scene again, 
namely the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the invasion of Iraq, the post-Arab uprisings, 
and the Iran Nuclear Deal. The current conflicts in the Middle East cannot be understood 
without studying the historical roots and understanding the different economic, political, 
and cultural dimensions. Also, understanding the impact of other factors such as 
colonialism is crucial.  
Colonialism shaped the politics and social structures of the Middle East in the last 
century and caused strong nationalist sentiments. For example, Gasiorowski and Reich 
(2014) argue that in Iraq, the British favored the Sunnis, who supported and oppressed the 
Shias, who opposed them, so after the British granted Iraq independence, they continued 
their favoritism by placing a Sunni Muslim in power. These historical events still affect the 
scene in Middle East politics. Also, the secret terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916, 
which staged for the creation of arbitrary borders and enclosing artificial states. Former 
U.S. Vice President Joe Biden states in a speech in Iraq in 2016, “because of history, we 
have drawn artificial lines, creating artificial states made up of totally distinct ethnic, 
religious, cultural groups” (Arango, 2016, para. 15). The next few pages explore the recent 
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milestones and factors, as indicated in my problem statement. 
4.1.1 The Iranian Revolution 
Iranian Revolution or the Islamic Revolution is the popular uprising that took place 
in Iran in 1978-79 when millions of people took the streets against the Iranian monarchy 
and the pro-Western shah. The revolution resulted in toppling the Shah, Mohammed Reza 
Pahlavi, on February 11, 1979, and ending the Pahlavi dynasty. The Iranian Revolution 
marked an essential milestone in the Middle East. It led to the establishment of the current 
state, the Islamic Republic of Iran. Also, it came with new doctrines embodied by the leader 
of the revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, which established a new era of 
relationship between Iran and other countries, not only in the Middle East but throughout 
the rest of the world. 
One important implication of the revolution is that it has converted the Shia ulama 
into a ruling class.  Also, the leader of the Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, went 
beyond the idea of a Shia revolution as he first defined it, into an Islamic revolution (Nasr, 
2007). Khomeini wanted to be accepted as a leader of the whole Muslim world. Moreover, 
the new Islamic Republic declared itself as the rule of the oppressed people in a way that 
made Iran become the Mecca of Muslim activists against oppression and a source of 
inspiration for all oppressed people in the Muslim world (Rahnema & Behdad, 1995). 
 Furthermore, Khomeini used his vision of a Muslim world, and he sought to 
emancipate the Islamic Ummah from the Western imperialism. That is why he believed 
that the United States is a source of evil that threatens Islam and works against the Islamic 
Ummah. He explicitly called it the “Great Satan.” He also saw any country in the Muslim 
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world that deals with the United States as a sign of a betrayal of Islam. He condemned 
regional powers, such as Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, but also other counties, such 
as Egypt, which he described as “Mini Satan” that serves to accommodate the “Great Satan.” 
He asked these countries to sever relations with the “great Satan,” the United States (Hiro, 
2018; Takeyh, 2006). 
   Khomeini used the slogan “A Revolution Without Borders” to identify his strategy 
to export the Revolution to other Islamic countries. Takeyh (2006) highlights that the 
original constitution of the Islamic Republic states that the purpose of the state was to create 
conditions to spread the noble and universal values of Islam. Moreover, in his speeches, he 
urged the local populace in the mini- Satan countries to emulate the Iranian Revolution 
model in their countries. Khomeini did not see himself as a head of state, but the leader of 
the entire community of believers. In addition to that, Iran clearly sought to undermine 
established authority in the name of Islamic redemption. Furthermore, Khomeini saw that 
the monarchical order was a source of oppression and tyranny, and this order was against 
Islam (Hiro, 2018; Nasr, 2007; Takeyh, 2006), which explicitly de-legitimated the Saudi 
monarchies and directly challenged their claim of legitimacy (Gause, 2014). 
In response to the Iranian Revolution, the Shia world welcomed the Iranian 
Revolution with great enthusiasm and hope. The Shias look at themselves as the oppressed 
sect that passed through a long history of oppression under Sunni leaders since the death 
of the Prophet. When the Shia population saw the Iranian Revolution that brought a Shia 
government to rule a Muslim country, they gained courage to loudly voice their rights and 
representations in their countries. Khomeini succeeded in introducing himself as a leader 
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that Shias in the whole world could depend on him. For example, Nasr (2007) gives an 
example of Khomeini’s support of the Shias in Pakistan when he threatened the Pakistani 
military ruler to face the same destiny of the ousted Shah in Iran if he mistreated the Shia, 
and the Pakistani government conceded.  
 Nakash (2006) argues that “The Islamic Revolution created an upheaval that 
emboldened Shia in the Arab world and reinforced a trend toward activism within Shia that 
continues to this day” (p. 158). Following the Iranian Revolution, Shias in the Eastern 
Province of Saudi Arabia celebrated the Ashura rituals after a lengthy 65-year ban in Qatif 
and other Shia majority towns, in a challenging message to the government (Hiro, 2018). 
Moreover, one year after the Iranian Revolution, the Saudi Shias celebrated the first 
anniversary of Imam Khomeini's return to Iran by organizing a massive demonstration and 
a series of strikes in Qatif in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia (Al-Rasheed, 1998). 
Nasr (2007) highlights other forms of Shia activism following the revolution, such as the 
failed coup attempt in Bahrain, terrorist plots in Kuwait in 1983 and 1984, and riots in the 
Eastern Province in Saudi Arabia. 
Khomeini used Iran’s Arabic-language radio to send messages to Shias to 
encourage them to rise against their regimes. One of the Shia activists was Hassan al Saffar, 
a Saudi Shia who lived in the Eastern Province. Al Saffar called to end the denunciations 
of Shia by Wahhabism, and he called for religious freedom for Shia in practicing their 
traditions. Following al Saffar’s calls, clashes between the Shia protesters and the national 
guard led to arrests, injuries, and killing (Hiro, 2018).  
 With the previous points in mind, the Iranian Revolution brought considerable 
37 
 
threats to the Gulf monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia, which saw it as a declaration of 
war against their monarchies and a severe threat to their rule. For example, Khomeini 
ridiculed Saudi Arabia for being named after a single-family (Nasr, 2007). Also, Khomeini 
made it clear when he called al -Sauds traitors to the great divine and puppets of the United 
States (Takeyh, 2006). He also attacked monarchies in his series of lectures published in 
1971 “Islamic Government: the rule of the faqih,” where he argued that “Shia clerics must 
strive to oust corrupt officials and repressive regimes and replace them with one led by just 
Islamic jurists” (Hiro, 2018, p 57). 
Also, Iran used violence and terrorism as another strategy to export its revolution 
to other countries. Iran started to export violence and terrorism to destabilize these states. 
For example, the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers, the housing of military personnel 
that killed nineteen American citizens. Also, during the pilgrimage (the haj), Iran 
encouraged protests in the holy mosque in Mecca to challenge Saudi monarchy and spread 
revolutionary messages around Muslims in the whole world. In July 1987, 402 Muslims 
died after clashes between Iranian pilgrims and Saudi police (Nasr, 2007). The Gulf states 
responded to the Iranian threat by establishing the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in May 1981 to counter and contain Iran's influence (Hiro, 2018; 
Quandt, 1981; Takeyh, 2006). As a way to counter Iran, the GCC’s started its work by 






4.1.2 Iraq Invasion  
 Another significant milestone in the course of sectarian violence in the Middle 
East is the Iraq Invasion by the United States-led coalition in 2003. In the wake of the 9/11 
attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and some targets in Washington, DC by 
al- Qaeda, the United States President George W. Bush declared his strategy of Global War 
On Terror (GWOT), promising to attack any target that may threaten the United States. 
Part of the GWOT strategy is fighting governments that export terror and shelter terrorists. 
According to Gasiorowski (2008), the goals for the U.S. invasion to Iraq were destroying 
the Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) sites and programs, getting rid of all 
Ba’athist influence, creating democratic political institutions, and restoring civil society 
and domestic security.  
The Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was Sunni, who ruled since 1979, a Shia 
majority country. According to the Pew Research Center in 2009, Shias in Iraq represent 
around 65-70 percent of the population, while Sunnis represent 25-35 percent of the 
Muslim Population. Moreover, research conducted in 2012 by Pew Research Center shows 
that sect affiliation is a defining aspect of Iraqis’ religious identity. Throughout history, the 
Sunnis in Iraq had most of the power and wealth, while Shias were oppressed and 
marginalized (Nasr, 2007; Rayburn, 2014). The discrimination against Shias continued 
until the end of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003. According to Anderson and Stansfield 
(2005), Sunni regimes have maintained their political dominance by keeping the Shia weak 
and divided. Shias have suffered from the systematic targeting and repressive activities of 
the central government. Saddam favored the Sunnis, who dominated the army and 
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government positions while also benefiting economically. Asquith (2009) mentions that the 
Sunnis had better access to land and electricity, and Saddam allocated the state resources 
and public funding to Sunni areas. Moreover, Karam (2007) highlights another dimension 
in the discrimination against Shias in Iraq. He states that “Sunni tribes also received special 
access to land, money, and weapons” (as cited in Hoffman, 2014, p. 8).  
Also, Shias faced religious discrimination, including rituals, publications, and 
institutions (Kirmanj, 2013). The Ba’ath regime also oppressed the Shias by closing 
religious schools, canceling religious media, and arresting Shi’a leaders (Anderson & 
Stansfield, 2005). Another major event in Iraq was the Shias and Kurds’ attempt to revolt 
after the Gulf War. Saddam sent his army to suppress the rebellion, which left about 30,000-
60,000 Shias dead, according to Zenko (2016). Anderson and Stansfield (2005) argue that 
the discrimination against Shia in Iraq was because the successive Sunni regimes, 
particularly of Saddam’s regime, worried about the potential threats of Shias to initiate 
mass political activity against the government. Also, Rayburn (2014) mentions that 
Saddam and his ruling party, the Ba’ath, had used the sectarian cards and cultivated ethnic 
and sectarian differences to shore up their rule. 
 In March 2003, the U.S. led a coalition to invade Iraq, which led to toppling 
Saddam Hussein’s regime. The regime change led to sectarian violence by opening up 
preexisting sectarian fractures. All sects aimed to exploit the post-Saddam political vacuum 
to advance their interests. Haddad (2013) argues that “one result of these developments 
was an intense and violent sectarian backlash facilitated and accelerated by the security 
vacuum and the general sense of chaos that followed the fall of Saddam” (p. 3). Two 
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months after the invasion, according to Kirmanj (2013), the United States established the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), a transitional government which issued the 
controversial order: the “de-Ba’athification” of the Iraqi state, a process barring all but the 
party’s junior members from public life, and the disbanding of the Iraqi army and all other 
state security organizations. Also, the CPA issued the dismantling of the Iraqi military and 
security forces. These two controversial orders shifted the situation dramatically. These 
sudden changes caused anger and unemployment, igniting Sunni opposition to the 
democratization process as these orders mean the exclusion of Sunnis, who had also been 
dominated these institutions and allowing their rivals from the Shia side.  
At the same time, Iraqi Shia groups and the Iranian allied exiles returned to Iraq in 
2003, intending to cement a permanent Shia ascendancy in Iraqi politics and society 
(Rayburn, 2014). Also, Barzegar (2010) highlights the emergence of many Shia parties 
aligned with the Iranian regime to exclude Sunnis and Ba’athists from Iraqi politics and 
government. During the parliamentary elections, Iran backed Shia-friendly factions and 
forcefully opposed the US policy of reintegrating some Ba’athist officers into Iraq’s army 
and law enforcement to prevent a Sunni-Ba’athist resurgence.  
In 2004, the U.S. created the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), which set the stage 
for continued sectarian conflict throughout the establishment of the new Iraqi government 
and for years to come. The main task of IIG was to hold elections. They succeeded by 
holding an election in January 2005 for the Transitional National Assembly that would 
create the constitution. This election contributed to Sunni marginalization for two reasons. 
First, Sunnis boycotted the election, which resulted in a small amount of Sunni seats in 
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parliament. Of the 275 seats, Shias won 146 seats while Sunnis only won six. Therefore, 
the Sunnis lacked even proportional representation and influence in the government. The 
second way this election contributed to Sunni marginalization was because the Sunnis were 
not well-represented in parliament, they did not have much influence over the creation of 
the constitution that would shape their government and their lives. In effect, most Sunnis 
voted against the constitution, which was adopted in October 2005 (Rayburn, 2014). 
As a result of the U.S. invasion, the majority of Shias gained power and wealth 
denied to them for centuries, and the Sunni minority relinquished their domination over 
Iraq. These sudden changes caused anger and unemployment, igniting Sunni opposition to 
the democratization process. Sunni insurgents began to use violence against Shias, and 
Shias retaliated. Sunni extremists thought they could regain their power through violence 
and fear. This thought was the introduction to al Qaeda’s emergence, which did not exist 
before the U.S. invasion.  
Sunnis began to wage war on the new Iraqi government and the Shia population. 
The leader of al- Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, indicated his desire to “draw the 
Shia into civil war as a means of mobilizing the Sunnis” (Rayburn, 2014, p. 112). This 
sectarian message by al- Qaeda received acceptance from Sunni insurgent groups. Also, 
Sunni groups and tribes supported al- Qaeda’s takeover in parts of Iraq to reduce the power 
of the Shia-led government (Abdo, 2017). In a clear sign of sectarian violence, al- Qaeda 
bombed the iconic Shia shrine in Samara in February 2006, al- Askari mosque. This event 
brought a massive response from Iraqi Shia militants (Kirmanj, 2013). Rabi and Mueller 
(2018) argue that the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) emerged out of the ashes of al-
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Qaeda with a doctrine to establish a Sunni Islamic Caliphate. This narrative contributed to 
the sectarian violence in Iraq as ISIS saw Shias as enemies and infidels who should be 
beheaded, and in response, Shias in Iraq started to respond violently. 
Last but not least, Shias in Saudi Arabia were watching the situation in Iraq. They 
thought that a Shia empowerment in Iraq would improve their lives by forcing their 
government to introduce serious reforms (Nakash, 2006). Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia 
started to fear the Shias’ empowerment in a neighboring country and took many steps to 
counter this new update in the regional power dynamics. Based on the previous events, 
Rayburn (2014) and Nasr (2007) argue that the U.S. invasion changed the power balance 
by bringing the majority Shia to power in Iraq and setting the stage for sectarian conflict 
in the Middle East. 
4.1.3 The post-Arab uprisings 
There is a long debate about the validity of describing the events that hit the Middle 
East region in terms such as the Arab Spring, Arab revolutions, revolutionary waves, and 
Arab uprisings. Gelvin (2018) mentions the advantages and disadvantages of each term or 
metaphor in detail. I use the term “Arab uprisings” in this thesis. 
The Arab uprisings began on December 17, 2010, when a street vendor, 
Mohammed Bouazizi, set himself on fire in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, as an objection to a 
policewoman who confiscated his stuff one day earlier. As a reaction, demonstrations 
quickly spread across Tunisia, calling for improving living conditions and political and 
social reform. These demonstrations continued and forced the resignation of President Zain 
Al- Abidine bin Ali after 23 years in office. 
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Later on, particularly on January 25, the demonstrations continued to Egypt, where 
young people took Tahrir Square in Cairo as an assembly point, calling for freedom, social 
justice, and bread, as a metaphor for good living conditions, before the demonstrations 
started to spread to other provinces in Egypt. Following this, in every major city, there was 
Tahrir square where the protestors started to call for regime change and they came up with 
the slogan “the people want to overthrow the regime.” On February 11, 2011, Egyptian 
President Hosni Mubarak announced his decision to give up his authority and hand it to 
the Supreme Council of Armed Forces. 
   The popular movements started in Tunisia and moved later to other countries, such 
as Egypt, Yemen, and Libya, toppling the authoritarian regimes and challenging the 
regimes in other countries, such as Syria and the Gulf monarchies. It was a tough moment 
for authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, as Gelvin (2018) mentions that most of the 
Middle East countries fit into the category of authoritarian regimes, according to the 
Economist Intelligence Unit in their Democracy Index in 2010. 
The Arab uprisings represent a milestone in the region as it marks the rise of 
sectarian narratives again fueled by the two rival powers in the region, Saudi Arabia and 
Iran. A clear example of sectarianism is the reaction to the demonstrations in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain (Bahrain). Following the uprising in Egypt, another protest sparked in Bahrain, 
a small island in the Persian Gulf linked to Saudi Arabia by King Fahed Causeway. Bahrain 
is ruled by the Sunni minority that makes up 30- 40 percent of the population according to 
Pew Research Forum estimates in 2012. The demonstrations took the Pearl Roundabout as 
their Tahrir Square in Egypt, calling for political reform, but the government replied 
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violently. Later on, Bahrain invited troops from the neighboring countries of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) to help restore the order and crush the opposition. Moreover, 
the regime forces have arrested many Shia activists and cordoned off rebellious Shia 
villages.  
In a similar case in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia, the strategically important 
region holding the Kingdom’s vast oil reserves, and where the majority of Shia live, there 
were callings for demonstrations, demanding the end of corruption, the release of political 
prisoners, and constitutional reforms. According to Rieger (2014), the Saudi government 
became concerned about a spillover to the Eastern Province. This concern was reinforced 
by the fact that many Saudi Shias identify with their fellow Shia brethren in Bahrain, who 
have also been suffering under sectarian discrimination by their government. Similar 
protest movements emerged in Yemen, Libya, and Syria, which turned into violence, civil 
wars, and military interference, which created an environment where fundamentalist 
Islamist groups found the soil to grow and get supported.  
Syria is a clear example of the sectarianism between Sunnis and Shias in the region 
and the ethno-sectarian lines that control life there. Syria is a Sunni-dominant country ruled 
by President Bashar al-Assad, who belongs to the Alawi sect. Although there are different 
opinions on the relationship between Alawi and Shiism, many scholars consider Alawi as 
“an offshoot of Shi’ism whose beliefs deviate from Islamic orthodoxy and include elements 
of Christianity and pre-Islamic religions” (Nasr, 2007, p. 61). 
 In the aftermath of the Syrian uprising, Rayburn (2014) explains how each sect 
worked to achieve their interests. For example, Sunnis who supported the uprisings and the 
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toppling of President Bashar al- Assad was supported by Iraqi Sunnis, who envisioned the 
establishment of a Sunni state in Syria after toppling Bashar, so the Iraqi’s Sunni tribes 
provided material support for the Syrian opposition to support the Sunni aspirations in the 
region. Similarly, Shia militant groups in Iraq and Lebanon supported their counterparts in 
Syria through military and logistics support from Iran’s IRGC or Hezbollah in Lebanon 
(Rayburn, 2014, pp. 230-231).  
4.1.3.1The response to the Arab uprisings 
As part of my argument about the contest for influence and political ambitions 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran, both countries adopted different approaches toward the 
uprisings. These demonstrations were met by violent repression from the governments of 
both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, which played the sectarian card and accused the protests 
of receiving foreign support from Iran to achieve Shia supremacy in the region (Salloukh, 
2017). 
On the one hand, Iran welcomed the Arab uprisings, except in Syria. Iran Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called the Arab uprisings “the Islamic awakening.” 
Moreover, he mentioned that the Arab uprisings were a significant defeat for the United 
States and Israel (Abdo, 2011). Also, the Iranian President Ahmadinejad praised the 
demonstrations and condemned the Saudi reaction of sending troops to Bahrain, equating 
it with Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (Hiro, 2018).  
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia was challenged and threatened by the Arab 
uprisings. It saw the change was coming to the kingdom following the electoral success of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and al- Nahda Islamic Movement in Tunisia, so the Saudi 
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government acted as an enemy to the uprisings from the beginning. Hiro (2018) mentions 
many examples, such as the kingdom’s offer to host the ousted Tunisian President Ben Ali 
in the kingdom. Also, the kingdom supported Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak by 
offering him refuge as well. The Council of Senior Ulama and the Grand Mufti of Saudi 
Arabia, Sheikh Abdul Aziz al- Sheikh, in 2011, according to Reuters (2011), described the 
demonstrations in Egypt and Tunisia as the chaos that comes from the enemies of Islam 
and the Grand Mufti argued the demonstrations would lead to bloodshed and instability. 
He also claimed that demonstrations are forbidden religiously. 
Furthermore, the Saudi government responded to calls for demonstrations in the 
kingdom by threatening the demonstrators with punishment. Hiro (2018) highlights some 
events when the Saudi government crushed supporters of the Arab uprisings, arrested many 
of them, and prohibited media coverages or appearances for many of the Arab uprisings’ 
supporters. The government used the sectarian card and the state intelligence agency 
destroyed to hack several Facebook pages, which called for demonstrations. The 
government added Shia references to the content of these pages to support its narratives 
and show that Shias, who are supported by Iran, were behind the demonstrations. 
4.1.4 Iran Nuclear Deal  
Iran’s ambition to have nuclear weapons and become a regional power started 
before the Islamic Revolution during the Shah’s rule through the “Atoms for Peace” 
program in cooperation with the U.S. (Entessar, 2017; Kinzer, 2011). Following the 1979 
Revolution, most of the international nuclear cooperation with Iran was cut off. In the 
1990s, Russia formed a joint research organization with Iran, providing Iran with Russian 
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nuclear experts and technical information. In the last few years, the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) has passed several resolutions calling for Iran to suspend its uranium 
enrichment and reprocessing activities and comply with its International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) obligations and responsibilities. Entessar (2017) mentions the motivations 
for Iran’s nuclear program, such as security reasons raised from the U.S. military presence 
on its borders, Israel’s nuclear weapons, and the absence of Iran’s strategic allies in the 
region. Iran has suffered from economic sanctions and isolation, partly because of its 
nuclear ambition, which threatens other regional powers. 
In July 2015, Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also 
known as “Iran Nuclear Deal,” after long and secret negotiations. JCPOA was a turning 
point in the Middle East. The deal was signed between Iran and the five permanent 
members of the Security Council, United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, plus 
Germany, and the European Union. Under this deal, Iran agreed to restrictions on its 
nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. The deal marked the end of isolation and 
sanctions on Iran, through which it started to have regular relationships with the 
international community and to use the international banking system. The deal unlocked 
about $100 billion to $150 billion in frozen Iranian bank accounts (Makovsky & Levitt, 
2015). 
 Ayoob (2016) and Nasr (2016) explain how the success of JCPOA affected regional 
tensions. Nasr (2016) mentions that Saudi Arabia interpreted the JCPOA as a gain to Iran 
and all Shia and as a change in the U.S. policy in the region. Also, Ayoob (2016) argues 
that Saudi Arabia was afraid of Iran’s rapprochement with the U.S. and Saudi Arabia was 
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worried about the economic empowerment of Iran as a competitive oil producer, so Saudi 
Arabia escalated the regional tensions and played the sectarian card by executing the Shia 
cleric Nimr al Nimr in January 2016, escalating the intensity of war in Syria, and adopting 
more aggressive strategy in Yemen. Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia confronted Iran 
diplomatically by opposing the nuclear deal with Iran and pressuring the U.S to withdraw 
from the deal through political lobbies against the deal and Obama administration. Recently, 
it welcomed the withdraw of the U.S. under President Trump’s administration. 
4.2 Religion as a political tool  
 Religion has a vital role in Middle Eastern societies, where people respect religion 
and look at it as the right way and the guide for their life. Authoritarian regimes and 
monarchies in the Middle East are aware of this fact, so they use religious text, historical 
events, and religious institutions to add legitimacy to their decisions.  
On the one hand, Al-Atawneh (2009) describes the Saudi regime as “a theo-
monarchy, that draws power from longstanding religio-cultural norms” (p. 721). Saudi 
Arabia has become a viable nation, not by implementing Muslim norms but by using 
religion as a mask. Avalos (2005) mentions that “in the name of Islam, the state introduced 
changes that would otherwise be unacceptable to a population less inclined to engage in 
the modern world” (p. 286). Also, many fundamentalist Sunni clerics, sponsored by 
wealthy Sunnis from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, have popularized anti-Shia slurs. 
For example, Saudi Arabia has the Supreme Council of Muslim Scholars or the Council of 
Senior Ulama, a religious institution that signs all the royal decisions and justifies them 
using many verses from the Quran. Also, it is popular to see the Grand Mufti of Saudi 
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Arabia, asking the citizens to obey the rulers and avoid any revolution against him. 
Furthermore, the religious institutions in Saudi Arabia have played an essential role 
in justifying the war in Yemen as a war on Islam and delegitimizing the opponent. Opotow 
(1990) highlights that de-legitimization denies the adversary's humanity and serves as a 
psychological permit to harm and to fight the rival group (as cited in Bar-Tal, Oren & Nets-
Zehngut, 2014). Another example of the use of religion in changing the political dynamics 
of the Middle East is the fatwa by the influential Sunni scholar, Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, who 
described the Syrian regime as “heretical” and he asked to support the Syrian people as 
kind of “jihad” (“Fatwa in the Gulf,” 2011). 
On the other hand, Shia religious leaders have used religion for political purposes 
as well. For example, during ISIS victory in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s 
top Shia cleric, issued a fatwa, religious decree, during a Friday sermon in 2014 to fight 
Sunni fighters advancing towards Baghdad. Also, he described this fight as a “sacred 
defense” and promised that whoever died fighting ISIS would be a martyr (Rabi & Mueller, 
2018). In response to his call, Alaaldin (2017) mentions that tens of thousands joined 
militias and formed the Shia Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) to fight against ISIS. 
4.3 Conflict Analysis Framework 
Although there are many causes and dimensions of any conflict, Levinger’s (2013) 
conflict analysis framework highlights the major dimensions of conflicts, and answers the 
question of “why do people or states engage in violent conflicts?” According to Levinger, 
there are five dimensions that can motivate or prevent violence; strategic, political, 
socioeconomic, psychological, and cultural dimensions. He also argues that not all 
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conflicts are violent; instead, actors use violence as a “strategic choice” to effectively 
achieve their objectives.  
Since the focus of this thesis is on sectarianism, Marc Lynch (2013) argues that 
ethnic or sectarian violence is the result of regimes, especially the authoritarian regimes, 
or elites, who exploit identity differences for their political goals. Also, Wehrey (2013; 
2017) highlights the role of geopolitical interests in the conflict. The next pages reflect on 
the thesis’s scope using Levinger’s conflict analysis framework to unpack the hidden 
reasons for sectarian violence in the Middle East.  
4.3.1The strategic dimension 
The strategic dimension of the conflict focuses on issues of power and international 
security between states. Iran and Saudi Arabia have supported competing factions in 
different parts of the world to enhance their global influence and further their interests 
through their engagement in proxy conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. From the 
perspective of the security dilemma, Kenneth Waltz (1979) argues that any actions taken 
by one state to enhance its security will necessarily decrease the security of other states (as 
cited in Levinger, 2013).  
On the one hand, Saudi Arabia started a military coalition named The Islamic 
Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC) in December 2015 by the defense minister, 
at this time, Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud. According to the official website of IMCTC, 
it aims to form a unified Pan-Islamic front against terrorism through joint work. This 
coalition has questions about its own main goals. One of these questions is the exclusion 
of Iran, which is an Islamic country, from the collation. Also, the coalition does not include 
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Iraq, which is led by a Shia government with a conflict with Saudi Arabia at this time. 
Winter (2017) highlights the Sunni nature of the alliance could deepen the Shia-
Sunni divide across the Middle East, and make the world perceive this coalition as a proxy 
to fight Shia, particularly Iran and its alliances and proxies in the region. 
Another point from the strategic dimension is Saudi Arabia’s strategic military 
partnership with the U.S. According to the official website of the White House (2017), 
Saudi Arabia signed billions of dollars of military and industrial deals with U.S. companies. 
In May 2017, President Trump and King Salman signed deals of $110 billion worth of 
defense capabilities and $350 billion over ten years. Additionally, President Trump and 
King Salman signed a Joint Strategic Vision Statement, promising close collaboration to 
counter violent extremism, disrupt the financing of terrorism, and advance defense 
cooperation. Also, the U.S. supports the Saudi-led coalition against Houthis in Yemen with 
assistance in intelligence, armaments deals, and logistics. According to new data from the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in April 2019, Saudi Arabia is 
one of the biggest five military spenders in 2018. Also, it is one of the highest military 
burden (military spending as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product, GDP) in the world 
in 2018 with a proportion of 8.8 percent of GDP. 
On the other hand, Iran has a long history of supporting proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, 
Syria, the Gaza Strip, and Yemen to further its interest. Also, Iran succeeded in starting 
partnerships with Russia, Turkey, and Qatar as a way to increase its security and encounter 
Saudi’s movements in the region. Hiro (2017) highlights the strategic importance of Iran, 
which represents the transit country for trade between Qatar and Turkey. Also, Iran shares 
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agreements with Russia on the Syrian conflict, and both countries support President Assad.   
Moreover, Iran has military cooperation with Russia that is explicit in the $ 900-
million-dollar contract for five Russian S-300 missile batteries. Also, Russia used the 
Hamadan military base in Iran to launch aerial strikes on a range of targets in Syria in 
August 2016 (Hiro, 2017). Iran adopts a “forward defense” strategy, as Nasr (2018) 
explains, because of the threats from Israel, the U.S. militaries in the region, and the hostile 
Arab neighbors. He also argues that Iran’s foreign policy is pragmatic, which is driven by 
national interests.  
  When it comes to the issues of power, Iran uses its nuclear program to deter its 
enemies, as Barash and Webel (2014) explain the basic premise of deterrence. Saudi Arabia 
and other countries are worried about the nuclear program and Iran’s ballistic missiles 
program, which threaten their security. That is why Saudi Arabia started to think of having 
nuclear weapons as Iran. In an interview with program 60 Minutes on CBS in March 2018, 
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman threatened that the kingdom would not 
hesitate to get a nuclear bomb if Iran obtains one. Moreover, Saudi Arabia calls on the 
international society to cut off any sources of financial support to Iran.   
Saudi Arabia has supported the isolation of Iran. That is why it was against the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCOPA) agreement in 2015. Saudi Arabia thought that this 
agreement would boost Iran’s power in the region (Dempsey, 2019). Saudi Arabia spared 
no effort to convince the U.S. and other countries to pull from the JCOPA. Recently, Saudi 
Arabia was one of the few countries in the world to praise President Trump’s decision to 
withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal in 2017. Last but not least, each country has accused 
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the other of destabilizing the region. For example, Saudi Arabia accuses Iran of supporting 
Houthi rebels in Yemen, threatening maritime shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, the 
primary energy transport waterway in the world, and blocking the delivery of humanitarian 
aid in Yemen while Iran accuses Saudi Arabia of financing terrorism and support radical 
groups in the region. 
4.3.2 The political dimension 
The political dimension of the analysis concerns the competition for power within 
individual states. Nasr (2016) argues that the leaders of both counties see political interests 
in exploiting the sectarian divide between Sunni and Shia to defend their rule and protect 
their interests. Lynch (2016) explains how the Saudi regime systematically uses 
sectarianism in order to control the Shia citizens. For example, when masses took the 
streets during the Arab uprisings, they were demanding freedom and dignity, without any 
reference to sectarian demands, but the regimes in the Middle East framed their demands 
into sectarian political narratives.  
Also, authoritarian regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, suppress opposition by 
providing open channels to their supporters to market their narrative only, which supports 
the political interests of the regimes. For example, in Saudi Arabia, the Sunni Wahhabi 
clerics are given the freedom and opportunity in the media to attack Shia without any 
interference from the government. For example, the hate speech against Shia by the Grand 
Mosque preacher in Mecca, who states “our war with Iran, say that out loud, is a war 
between Sunnis and Shiites...Our disagreement with Rafidh will not be removed, nor our 
suicide to fight them... as long as they are on the face of the earth” (Mohammed, 2015, 
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para. 3). Additionally, authoritarian regimes use some strategies of ethnic favoritism, such 
as providing high positions and social services for the exclusive benefits of their ethnic 
groups. For instance, high positions in the government and military are exclusive for Sunni 
in Saudi Arabia and similarly for Shia in Iran.  
Moreover, political and official state institutions can act as dividers, provoking 
sectarian divisions, such as the Commission of Promotion for Virtue and Prevention of 
Vice and the Committee of Senior Ulama in Saudi Arabia, which explicitly attack Shia. In 
addition to the fact that both countries seek regional hegemony, they depend on nationalism 
for their political interests. Nasr (2018) and Hiro (2018) highlight the rise of nationalism 
rhetoric in Iran to restore the glory of the Persian Empire, which controlled a vast area in 
the region, and how these aspirations influence the political dynamics in the conflict. Also, 
Saudi Arabia uses the nationalism narrative when it comes to Iran as not a real Muslim or 
Arab country, but Persian one, so it demonizes Iran and demonizes the Shia population by 
associating them to Iran. All these sectarian policies and discrimination serve as dividers 
in the prolonged conflict. 
Matthiesen (2009) explains another form of the political dimension of the conflict, 
which is the rise of succession movements. For example, in Saudi Arabia, there have been 
some calls for the succession of the Eastern Province, especially in 1978 and after Biqa 
clashes in 2009, besides the emergence of anti-government groups to denounce the 
discrimination against Shia, such as the Free Youth of Qatif, the Organization of Islamic 
Revolution, and other group that advocate for the armed struggle against the government, 
such as Hezbollah Al Hejaz.  
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4.3.3 The socioeconomic dimension  
The socioeconomic aspect plays a vital role in conflict dynamics. Stewart (2004) 
argues that inequality is a threat to social cohesion within the state. Through his studies, he 
found that economically underprivileged groups that did not have access to political power 
had taken some actions to assert group interests ranging from nonviolent protest to 
rebellion (as cited in Levinger, 2013). The availability of petroleum in both countries makes 
high expectations of high income and social benefits for all citizens, but this is not the case 
in both countries. Collier (2000) argues that the availability of lootable resources such as 
petroleum in a country motivates conflict (as cited in Levinger, 2013). 
On the one hand, Matthiesen (2015) illustrates the history of the Saudi Shia as 
citizens of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is characterized by otherness with discrimination 
against them at many different levels. The Shias of Saudi Arabia, as Perazzo (2012) 
examines through surveys, have been classified through the social, political, and religious 
spheres as second-class citizens with unequal fair access to job opportunities and public 
services. Also, according to Nasr (2007), they are not allowed key positions in the 
government, armed forces, security services, or significant companies or the military.  
On the other hand, the Sunni Muslims in Iran, which constitute about 5-10% of the 
population, according to the CIA World Factbook in 2019, face systematic discrimination 
in Iran. Faramarzi (2018) highlights that Iran has failed to adequately integrate its Sunni 
population into the political system. For example, there has never been a Sunni minister, 
and there is a low representation of the Sunnis in the parliament that does not reflect the 
actual Sunni population. Moreover, in Iran, the president should be Shia. According to 
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article 115 of chapter nine in the Iranian constitution, the president of Iran should believe 
in the fundamentals of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the official religion of the country, 
which is according to article 12 of chapter one, the official religion of Iran is Islam and the 
Twelver Ja‘fari school of Shia religion. 
Also, in both countries, each minority group feels stigma to pray freely, and they 
are subjected to the social stigma that they have to hide their identity (Faramarzi, 2018; 
Perazzo, 2012). Furthermore, Sunnis do not have mosques in large cities such as Tehran 
and Isfahan, and their areas are undeveloped. Similarly, Shias in Saudi Arabia have many 
restrictions on building mosques, hussainiyyat, and community centers (Matthiesen, 2015). 
Dabashi (2018) argues that the negligence of the central government in Tehran through the 
last decades is responsible for the anger among minority groups in Iran, and Gengler (2016) 
argues that the regime marginalizes some groups and rewards others with economic 
benefits for political reasons.  
4.3.4 The psychological dimension 
It is essential to understand how the psychological dimension affects the dynamics 
of the conflict. The psychological dimension, according to Levinger (2013), illustrates how 
each party in the conflict perceives the other parties and the role of collective images of the 
other groups in shaping groups’ attitudes and conduct toward their rivals. In our case study, 
the psychological factors in the Sunni- Shia conflict serve as dividers that escalate and 
sustain the conflict. 
For example, Sunnis look at Shias in a suspicious way as traitors to Iran or not real 
Muslims. Many Sunni clerics, such as late Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia Abdul Aziz Bin 
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Baz, described Shia Twelvers as Rafedha and Ali worshipers. Moreover, notable Saudi 
Scholar, Ibn Jebreen, issued a fatwa “not to marry or eat with Shias and not to allow Shias 
to pray in Muslim mosques” (as cited in Perazzo, 2012). Maida (2017) highlights the level 
of hate speech, incitement to hatred, and discrimination against Shias and how the religion 
curriculum in the educational system employs anti-Shia rhetoric. 
Another point regarding the psychological dimension is the role of the collective 
image. Bar- Tal, Oren, and Nets-Zehngut (2014) talk in their article about the psychological 
dimension in the intractable conflicts. They argue that societies involved in such conflicts 
form conflict supportive narratives to justify the intergroup conflicts and satisfy 
psychological needs through significant themes, such as de-legitimization of the opponent 
or victimization of the group. Bar-Tal (2013) identifies collective narratives as “social 
constructions that coherently interrelate a sequence of historical and current events; they 
are accounts of a community’s collective experiences, embodied in its belief system and 
represent the collective’s symbolically constructed shared identity” (p. 22). Also, he 
highlights the importance of collective memory in the construction of group identity and 
the formation of any society or group. This is evident in the Sunni- Shia conflict through 
the Battle of Karbala, as explained in Chapter Three.  
Karbala is an excellent example of what Volkan (2001) describes as the chosen 
trauma, which is “the shared mental representation of a negative event in a large group’s 
history in which the group suffered catastrophic loss” (p. 7). He adds that chosen trauma is 
an essential part of group identity as it helps identify a common enemy of the group. The 
story of Karbala, which is passed from generation to generation, represents powerful 
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experiences and shared feelings of humiliation, vengeance, and hatred. Over the years and 
till the recent proxy wars in the region, Karbala has been used by Shia Muslims to 
encourage them to fight their Sunni enemies. 
4.3.5 Cultural dimension 
The cultural dimension of conflict, according to Levinger (2013), involves issues 
of collective identity such as ethnicity, religion, nationality, or language. The identity is an 
essential dimension in fueling violence in our case study. Both countries claim 
exceptionalism (Hiro, 2018). On the one hand, the Iranian claim rests on 6000 years of 
civilization with a unique sense of history, civilizations, empires that stretched to control 
many areas (Hiro, 2018; Tekayah, 2006). On the other hand, Saudi Arabia’s claim of 
exceptionalism rests on having the largest oil corporation in the world, number one exporter 
of oil, and home to the most sacred sites in Islam in Mecca where Muslims from all sects 
perform pilgrimage and point their faces while praying, and Medina where the Prophet is 
buried (Hiro, 2018).  
Also, Saudi Arabia and Iran are different in ethnicity, religious sect, and language, 
so there is a large portion of identity aspects and nationalism in the conflict. Identity is an 
essential element in the cultural dimension of the conflict. Although it is a broad concept, 
and it is hard to define, this thesis focuses on sectarian identities. Sectarianism refers to the 
presence of multiple sectarian identity groups in a state (Phillips, 2015). Anderson (1995) 
argues that mutual cultural identity central to nationalist groups is merely fictional and 
invoked by political leaders for political goals. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other authoritarian 
systems, according to Kressel (2002), try to cover their failures by creating an internal or 
59 
 
external enemy of the nation to grab attention to fight this enemy instead of focusing on 
criticizing policies. 
Nationalism has played an essential role in the Saudi-Iranian conflict. Van Evera 
(1994) defines nationalist group as “a set of individuals holding their most important 
loyalty to their ethnic or national group, with this superseding other loyalties (such as 
political ideology, religious ideology, etc.), although these additional influences may 
contribute to their cultural identity, which in turn may be central to their nationalist identity” 
(p. 5). Conversi (2006) argues that discriminatory acts against competing nations, such as 
assimilation, marginalization, and genocide, are because of the exaltation of a dominant 
nation as superior to all other nations. Shaw (2015) explains that nationalists see the ideal 
format of state-building is based on ethnicity, which means the strength of the nation allows 
one form of culture only. Anastasiou (2008) argues that this nationalist environment 
provokes the conflict and even “imposes a particular way of treating and processing pain. 
It entails a kind of shared superego, specifying how an ethnically defined society or 
community ought to respond to the suffering resulting from ethnonational conflict” (p. 125). 
 For example, Shia in Saudi Arabia had to counter the accusation of Saudi-Wahhabi 
propaganda to them as Persians, not Arabs, through proving their authentic identity that 
rooted in Arab culture and history (Al-Rasheed, 1998). 
Another form of the cultural dimension of the conflict is cultural annihilation, 
which may encompass, according to Conversi (2006), a physical dimension of murder, like 
the elimination of the intellectuals and professional cadres. The execution of Shia cleric, 
Nimr al Nimr, and other Shia activists is an excellent example in Saudi Arabia.  
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 Language represents a crucial cultural dimension in the Sunni- Shia rivalry. On the 
one hand, Sunnis describe Shias in the Gulf countries as “Safawis,” a term that paints them 
as Iranian agents (from the Safadi Empire) and hence, traitors to the Arab cause. Also, 
hard-liner Sunni Islamists have used harsher historical terms, such as Rafdaha, rejecters of 
the faith, and Magus, Zoroastrian, or crypto Persian, to describe Shias as heretical. On the 
other hand, Iranian officials, Iraqi politicians, and Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbol-
lah, routinely describe their Sunni opponents as takfiris (referring to the doctrine embraced 
by al-Qaeda of declaring fellow Muslims apostate) and Wahhabis (referring to the puritan-
ical Saudi sect). This cycle of demonization has been amplified throughout the Middle East 
and has its devastating effects on many levels. Last but not least, framing the conflict in 
sectarian terms has affected the stability of the region and caused the emergence of new 
areas of influence based on sectarian and ethnic identities (see Figure 6). 
4.4 Stakeholder analysis 
        As mentioned in the literature review, the Iranian Revolution, invasion of Iraq, the 
Arab uprisings, and the Iran Nuclear Deal have changed the power dynamics in the region 
and the dynamics of the political and economic landscape in different ways. Nasr (2016) 
argues that Saudi leaders see Shiism as a threat to their faith and Iran as a threat to their 
security. Although Nasr excludes the possibility of a direct war between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, both countries continue to fight in other areas in the region to protect and further 
their interests. For example, Clarke and Smyth (2017) explain how Iran succeeded in 
expanding networks and recruited Shia from Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight in Iraq, 
Syria, and Yemen. Iran included sectarian narratives in the recruitment process so that some 
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fighters joined to protect the holy Shia shrines in Syria.  
The indirect fight or proxy wars have become the evident form of confrontation 
between both countries (Gause, 2014; Nasr, 2016). Both countries have sought to expand 
influence in other countries. A member of the Iranian parliament, who is close to Khamenei, 
said that Iran controlled four Arab capitals: Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Sana’a (as 
cited in Byman, 2018) in an evident example of Iran’s strategy in the region.  
              Mumford (2013) defines proxy wars as “the indirect engagement in a conflict by 
third parties wishing to influence its strategic outcome. They are constitutive of a 
relationship between a benefactor, who is a state or non- state actor external to the dynamic 
of an existing conflict, and their chosen proxies, which are the conduit for weapons, 
training, and funding from the benefactor” (p.11). Additionally, he adds that proxy 
intervention can only occur if the benefactor state takes no active role in combat, and if the 
benefactor state acts to support its proxy surrogate in a non-allied or quasi-allied 
context. Moreover, Frederic Pearson (1974) identifies primary reasons for states’ 
intervention in other countries: territorial acquisition, protection of social groups, 
protection of economic interests, protection of diplomatic or military interests, ideology, or 
regional power balances (as cited in Mumford, 2013). In addition, Mumford (2013) adds 
other motives, such as the perception of probable success or perception of conflict 
escalation. 
              Based on Mumford’s definition, we see that both Saudi Arabia and Iran are a good 
case study. Both countries fund local groups to achieve their interests. We have never seen 
a direct confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran; both armies have not reportedly 
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fought, or there were never any missiles directed by an army against the other. Moreover, 
Mumford also suggests that proxy wars are typically conducted by states hoping to exploit 
localized events to create a “shift in the wider geopolitical environment” (p. 11). This is 
proven in our case study by many scholars such as Gause (2014), who frames the current 
situation in the Middle East as a cold war between main actors, Saudi Arabia and Iran, and 
other states and non-state actors. He also highlights the fact that both countries take 
advantage of the weak states and sponsor non-state actors on the battlefields of weakened 
Arab states. Also, Salloukh (2017) explains how the contest between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
shaped the geopolitics of the region. 
Iran had the opportunity to fill the postwar vacuum in Iraq based on its religious 
relationship with the Shia majority in Iraq and its geographical location as a neighboring 
country (Rayburn, 2014). The increase of the Iranian influence has sparked the concerns 
that Iran will have Shia Crescent in the region, which links Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Iran 
(see Figure 7). The term “Shia Crescent” was first coined by King Abdullah II of Jordan in 
2004 (Hiro, 2018; Salloukh, 2017). While describing the regional development using the 
sectarian language, King Abdullah II alarmed Saudi Arabia and other Sunni countries to 
take action. So, Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, has sided with a group of Arabic countries, 
such as Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Yemen, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. 
Also, Israel has become part of this side, as indicated later in this chapter. 
 On the other hand, Iran extended its alliance to include other non-state actors in 
the region, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad Movement in 
Palestine (Salloukh, 2017). Iran supported non-state actors for many reasons. Takeyh (2006) 
63 
 
and Razavi (2013) argue that Iran supports Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in Palestine to 
have a voice in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and gain a degree of popularity among the 
Arab world. Also, Ward (2005) highlights that Iran depends on proxies to deter or attack 
its adversaries because of its outdated military capacity. Saudi Arabia and Iran extend their 
rivalry by supporting proxy wars in other countries in the region. The next few pages 
elaborate on the proxies and the stakeholders engaged in the conflict using the framework 
mentioned in Chapter Two. 
4.4.1 Lebanon 
Lebanon, with its diverse population and 18 recognized religious sects, has become 
a battlefield for the Saudi-Iranian geopolitical contest. According to the CIA World 
Factbook in 2019, the Shia Muslims constitute 28.4% and Sunni 28.7% of Lebanon's 
population. Also, “the constitution consecrated confessional groups and sects as the main 
pillars of Lebanese society” (Salloukh, 2017, p. 219). In Lebanon, the president is Maronite 
Christian, the speaker of the parliament is a Shia Muslim, and the prime minister is a Sunni 
Muslim.  
Lebanon, which suffered from long civil war 1975-1992, passed through many 
significant milestones, such as the assassination of the former Sunni Prime Minister Rafiq 
al- Hariri in 2005 in Beirut. Following the assassination of Hariri, Salloukh (2013) 
highlights the tensions in the country, which became more divided between a Sunni camp 
and Shia camp. Lebanese society split into groups. On the one hand, the March 14 Coalition 
led by Sunni-dominated Future Movement with support from Saudi Arabia, Gulf states, 




A recent update that reflects the war between Saudi Arabia and Iran in Lebanon is 
the resignation of the Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al- Hariri, under the pressure of Saudi 
Arabia, in a way to destabilize Iran’s ally, Hezbollah, which has a powerful military and 
political power in the country (Ignatius, 2017). Hariri mentioned that he could withdraw 
his resignation if Hezbollah agreed to abide by Lebanon’s policy of disassociation from 
the conflicts ravaging the region, primarily calling on the Shia group to pull out of Yemen, 
Syria, and Iraq (Blanford, 2017). This new situation reflects the sectarian dimensions and 
proxy wars in Lebanon. Iran has a strong influence in Lebanon. Zainulbhai and Richard 
(2015) mention that more than nine-in-ten Lebanese Shia Muslims (95%) express a 
favorable opinion of Iran. Lebanon is vital to Iran as one of the Shia crescent countries with 
a border with Israel, which is a security threat to Iran. 
4.4.2 Hezbollah  
Hezbollah or the “Party of God” is Formed in 1982 in response to the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon. According to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in 2015, 
Hezbollah is a Lebanon-based Shia terrorist group, which advocates Shia empowerment 
globally. Moreover, it is the most capable armed group in Lebanon. It receives support from 
Shia, some Christians, and receives considerable support from Iran (CIA, 2018). Also, 
many scholars, such as Kindt (2009), argue that it is a “state within a state” with a dominant 
position. For example, In July 2011, the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) indicted 
four Hezbollah members, including a senior Hezbollah official, for the assassination of 
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al- Hariri, but Hezbollah Secretary-General, Hasan 
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Nasrallah, publicly stated that Hezbollah would not allow any members to be arrested in a 
challenge to the state. 
Hezbollah is Iran’s tool in Lebanon. According to the US Treasury under-secretary 
for terrorism and financial intelligence, Sigal Mandelker, in 2018, Iran directly funds the 
group with approximately upwards of $700 million a year. One of the missions of 
Hezbollah is to advance the Shia agenda through funding, training, and weapons. The 
Lebanese Forces Website (2009) published audio of Hezbollah’s leader stated that the 
party’s ideology is modeled on the teachings of Ayatollah Khomeini regarding the Islamic 
government. Hezbollah is allied with Iran’s regional policy in the region. Hassan Nasrallah 
publicly indicated that Hezbollah was supporting Bashar al-Assad’s regime by sending 
fighters to Syria (Cowell & Barnard, 2013). Also, Nasrallah stated in one of his speeches 
that “we are open about the fact that Hezbollah’s budget, its income, its expenses, 
everything it eats and drinks, its weapons and rockets, come from the Islamic Republic of 
Iran” (Rafizadeh, 2016, para. 2).  
Moreover, Hezbollah serves Iran’s agenda in the region by fighting Iran’s enemies. 
Salloukh (2017) and Makhzoumi (2010) argue that Hezbollah supported Shia groups in 
Iraq and trained them on guerrilla warfare against U.S. troops. Similarly, Salisbury (2015) 
mentions that Hezbollah supported the Houthis in Yemen against Saudi Arabia. According 
to the International Crisis Group’s report in 2018, Hezbollah has an arsenal of tens of 
thousands of rockets and missiles that can reach deep into Israel. Karam (2019) reflects on 
the partnership between Hezbollah and Iran. Recently, during a celebrating of the 40th 
anniversary of Iran’s Islamic Revolution in Beirut in February 2019, Hassan Nasrallah 
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threatened America to launch a war if the U.S. attacked Iran.  
4.4.3 Syria  
Syria is an essential country for Iran as a gateway for its influence in Lebanon and 
Palestine (Abdo, 2011; Mabon, 2016), and it is the front line of defense against the United 
States and Israel (Abdo, 2011). Assad’s family, which is Alawi, runs Syria. Goldsmith 
(2012) argues that Alawis, who comprise roughly 13 percent of the population, have been 
instrumental in maintaining President Bashar al-Assad’s hold on power as they form the 
main state apparatus. Syria is one of the Shia crescent countries with a strong relationship 
with Iran, which worries Saudi Arabia and other Sunni allies. For example, Syria refused 
the Iraqi invasion of Iran, which was supported by Saudi Araba and other Sunni countries. 
Moreover, in the aftermath of Arab uprisings, Saudi Arabia and Iran had different 
approaches towards the uprisings in Syria and each country tried to impose its interests 
through sectarian lenses to the degree which makes the Syrian’s war, according to (lynch, 
2016), is the most significant incubator of sectarianism. 
On the one hand, Byman (2019) argues that the Saudis have long wanted the ousting 
of the Alawi Assad, who rules over a majority Sunni state, so Saudi Arabia supported 
regime change in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. Also, in order to cut the way for Iran 
to transfer weapons to Hezbollah and prevent the Shia crescent, Saudi Arabia supported 
rebels and Salafi jihadists. Moreover, Saudi Arabia supported the ousting of Syria out of 
the Arab League. Salloukh (2017) illustrates how the relationship between Syria and Saudi 
Arabia has intensified to the degree that Syria explicitly accused Saudi Arabia of interfering 
in its domestic policies and financing Salafi groups and jihadists in the region.  
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On the other hand, Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has made it clear 
that Tehran supported Assad and saw the uprising in Syria as U.S. and Israeli ploy (Abdo, 
2011). Also, Iran committed significant resources to shore up the Assad regime. Byman 
(2019) highlights the forms of Iranian support to Assad, such as deploying thousands of 
IRGC members and Shia fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight in Syria. 
Moreover, he mentions some estimates that Iran has spent over $15 billion on the Syrian 
war to support its geopolitical interests. 
4.4.4 Iraq 
Iraq has a strategic location in the Middle East, with borders with Iran and Saudi 
Arabia. Iraq had been an important player in regional politics for decades. Following the 
U.S. invasion in 2003, the emerging of political violence and sectarian strife over identity 
and legitimacy were the main themes in Iraq. Haddad (2017) defines the sectarianization 
of Iraq because of” the dynamics between Shia– centric state building and Sunni rejection 
of this state-building” (p. 116). Also, following the state’s collapse in 2003, Gause (2014) 
highlights that Iraq became a battle-ground of sectarianism in the region and citizens 
looked to their co-religionists for support, so according to Dodge (2012), Shia groups 
looked to Iran and Sunnis looked to Saudi Arabia (as cited in Gause, 2014). 
As explained in Chapter Three, following the U.S. invasion, Iran succeeded in 
posting itself as a key player in Iraq’s politics by supporting the majority of Shia allies in 
many different forms. Recently, Irish and Rasheed (2018) mention that Iran succeeded in 
transferring missiles to Iraqi-Shia militias and succeeded in developing the capacity to 
build more locations for missiles’ factories in Iraq to further its regional interest. Also, this 
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report claims that the ballistic missiles’ ranges could reach to Riyadh, the capital of Saudi 
Arabia, and Tel Aviv, the capital of Israel, in a clear threat to Iran’s regional foes. Moreover, 
Clarke and Smyth (2017) explain another dimension of Iran’s influence over Iraq through 
the foreign fighters’ network. Iran recruited many Shia fighters who have been fighting 
alongside Iranian troops in Iraq.  
Gause (2014) argues that the Saudis failed to constrain Iranian influence in Iraq 
although several attempts, such as supporting some Salafi groups, such as al-Sahwa 
(Awakening) movement in 2006, or backing the Iraqiya Party in the elections. Similarly, 
Hegghammer (2007) follows the participation of Saudi citizens in the Iraqi insurgency. He 
mentions that there were many Saudi citizens who participated in fighting in Iraq in jihadi 
groups and committed several suicide bombings against Shia targets in Iraq. Also, 
according to Cooper (2007), Saudis reportedly sent money and foreign fighters to support 
Sunni insurgents in Iraq while the government did not do anything to prevent the flow. 
4.4.5 Yemen  
Yemen has a strategic location at the south entrance of the red sea and the Gulf of 
Aden (see Figure 1). It shares about 1307 km of land borders with Saudi Arabia, according 
to CIA World Factbook in 2019. Salisbury (2015) and Laub (2016) trace the recent war in 
Yemen to 2014, when Houthi rebels from north Yemen took control of the capital, Sana’a. 
Houthis are Shia Muslims, who belong to the Zaydi sect of Shiism. Although Zaydi Shiism 
is distinct from the Twelver Shiism, found in Iran, Saudi considered them as proxy agents 
of Iran that threaten its southern border, so Saudi Arabia led a coalition of allied countries 
under the name of the “decisive storm” to launch a series of airstrikes against Houthis. 
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According to Riedel (2017), the monthly cost of the war in Yemen for Saudi Arabia is at 
least $5-6 billion a month.  
The Houthis have responded to Saudi airstrikes with missile attacks on Saudi 
Arabian infrastructure and territory, including oil tankers, facilities, and international 
airports in the Southern Province. Stewart (2017) mentions that Iran supported the Houthis 
with short-range ballistic missiles. Also, Riedel (2017) says that Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah, 
also assisted the Houthis.  According to the Global Conflict Tracker in 2019, The Saudi 
naval blockade succeeded in intercepting numerous Iranian weapons shipments to Houthi 
rebels in the Gulf of Aden. As a result of the proxy war, Yemen lives now in the worst 
humanitarian crisis, as described by the United Nations. According to the Armed Conflict 
Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) in 2019, the war has killed more than 91,000 
since 2015. 
4.4.6 Israel 
Sachs (2019) and Takeyh (2009) explain how the relationship between Israel and 
Iran turned from friendship, before the Islamic Revolution, to enmity. The Iranian 
Revolution came with calls of the extinction of Israel and described it as a little Satan. 
Teitelbaum and Segall (2012) gather some quotes from Iranian leaders against Israel. These 
quotes call on the elimination of Israel from the region, killing the Zionist regime, and 
laying out the legal and religious justification for the destruction of Israel. For example, in 
December 2000, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who repeatedly attacked Israel, said: “Iran’s 
position, which was first expressed by the Imam Khomeini and stated several times by 
those responsible, is that the cancerous tumor called Israel must be uprooted from the 
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region” (p. 6).  
Although Iran has no borders with Israel or any history of armed conflicts, Iran 
maintains a hostile relationship with Israel for reasons of power and regional hegemony.  
Iran wants to introduce itself as the defender of the Muslim world against Israel’s crimes 
in the Muslim world. Also, Iran succeeded in establishing strong ties with Israel’s 
neighbors, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas in 
Palestine, through the Axis of resistance. This axis of resistance represents the most 
significant security threat to Israel.   
Salloukh (2017) explains that Iran’s relationships with this axis of resistance are 
strategic in order to deter Israel or its allies from attacking Iran, fearing retaliation of its 
proxies. Wermenbol (2019) explains how the Iranian proxy activities in Iraq and Syria have 
threatened Israel's security, so that Israel was pressured to prevent arms transfers to regional 
proxies in Lebanon and Syria. Moreover, Sachs (2019) argues that Iran and Israel's enmity 
is beneficial for both countries. On the one hand, Iran uses the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
as a tool to introduce itself as a leader in the Islamic world, interfere in the Middle-Eastern 
affairs, and compete with Saudi Arabia, which prided itself as the main actor in this conflict. 
Sachs also argues that Iran wanted to make the point that the Palestinian- Israeli conflict is 
not exclusive to Arab countries, but rather an Islamic cause. On the other hand, Israel 
benefits from the enmity in starting a new cooperation with the Arab states by diverting 
attention from domestic affairs, including political corruption and human rights abuses. 
Saudi Arabia and Israel do not have official diplomatic relations, but the strategic 
and pragmatic shared goals created a rapprochement between two countries, as Sachs (2019) 
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expresses, “my enemy’s enemy can be my friend.” Many scholars explain the reasons 
behind this rapprochement, such as Sachs (2019) and Hiro (2018), who argue that both 
countries are against Iran’s nuclear deal and Assad in Syria. Moreover, Abadi (2019) 
highlights other reasons, such as Saudi’s desire to maintain its ties with the U.S., a strong 
ally of Israel, and for security concerns. Also, Israeli high-tech companies have provided 
crucial security products for Saudi intelligence (Rabi & Mueller, 2017).  
At this point, the relationship is secret. According to Mabon (2016), the relationship 
detracts from Saudi Arabia’s narrative of Islamic legitimacy as such cooperation is against 
the Muslim cause because of Israel’s bad reputation in the Muslim world.  
4.4.7 The United States 
The United States has a strong relationship with Saudi Arabia and a deteriorating 
relationship with Iran. Saudi Arabia is the largest importer of U.S. weapons, according to 
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in March 2019.  Also, 
President Trump visited Saudi Arabia on his first presidential trip in May 2017. He pulled 
the U.S. out of JCOPA in support of Saudi requests.   
Moreover, the U.S. officially designated IRGC in 2019 as a foreign terrorist 
organization (FTO), which made it hard for any company or people to do business with 
Iran. According to a statement by the White House in April 2019, this designation will be 
the first time that the U.S. has ever named a part of another government as FTO. 
Furthermore, the U.S. also sanctioned Iranian state-owned banks to pressure the Iranian 
economy (Schanzer & Salter, 2019). 
Kinzer (2011) explains the tensions in American-Iranian relationships. He 
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highlights that the Iranians did not forget the American government’s role in setting Iran 
on the road of dictatorship by overthrowing the first-ever elected democratic Prime 
Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in a coup planned by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) in 1953, and other milestones in the relationship between both countries, such as the 
Islamic Revolution, and the hostage crisis. 
Last but not least, by withdrawing from the JCPOA, the U.S. has re-imposed 
sanctions on Iran. President Trump, in a statement in August 2018, he mentioned his 
decision is due to Iran’s activities in supporting terrorism, developing the ballistic and 
nuclear weapons programs, and interference in the affairs of other countries in the region. 
These sanctions have a catastrophic impact on Iran’s economy and Iranian daily life. Also, 
the sanctions forced Iran to adopt more aggressive policies in the Middle East. 
4.4.8 Russia  
Although Russia is not a country in the Middle East, it has played an essential role 
in the power dynamics in that region. MacDonald (2019) and Wormuth (2019) identify 
Russian interests in the Middle East, particularly Syria. They argue that Russian presence 
in Syria granted it access to a Meditation seaport, airbase, and a place to test new weapons. 
In addition, Russia sees the engagement with the Middle East is a way to re-establish itself 
as a great world power and reliable partner in confrontation with the United States.  
Russia partnered with Hezbollah and Iran to support President Assad in Syria, and 
they succeeded in saving his life and fighting his opponents (Clarke & Tabatabai, 2018). 
Although Russia’s support to Assad was against Saudi’s will, Russia has good relationships 
with Iran and Saudi Arabia. According to Wormuth (2019), Russia sold arms and weapons 
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to both countries. Russia’s role as a stakeholder in the Middle East is merely motivated by 
its geopolitical interests. 
4.4.9 Egypt  
Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world, with about 90 % of the 
population Sunni Muslims, according to the CIA World Factbook in 2019. Egypt has a 
better relationship with Saudi Arabia than Iran.  
On the one hand, the diplomatic ties between Egypt and Iran were severed in 1980 
when late President Anwar al Sadat gave asylum to the overthrown Shah, Mohamed Reza, 
after the Islamic Revolution. Bahgat (2009) identifies the milestones in bilateral relations, 
such as Egypt’s support to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. Moreover, Iran and Egypt broke 
diplomatic relations in 1979 after Iran condemned Egyptian President Sadat for signing the 
Camp David Peace Accords with Israel. In April 2006, former President Hosni Mubarak 
said in an interview that Shias across the Middle East are more loyal to Iran than to their 
own countries. This statement angered Shia populations in the Middle East and intensified 
the tensions between Egypt and Shias in the region (Green, Wehrey, & Wolf, 2009). 
On the other hand, Egypt has strong ties with Saudi Arabia at all levels. Recently 
President Sisi made clear statements that the Egyptian army will support the Gulf states 
against any threats (Reuters, 2018). Also, Egypt is part of the Islamic Military Counter 
Terrorism Coalition, led by Saudi Arabia. 
4.4.10 Turkey 
Kirişci (2019) explains the development of relationships between Turkey and Iran. 
Before the Iranian Revolution, Turkey hosted Khomeini during his early exile as well as 
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other Iranian dissidents. After the Revolution, bilateral relations continued to have tensions 
because of Turkey’s secular governmental approaches and military partnership with Israel, 
which were against the core principles of the Iranian Revolution. Recently, following the 
Syrian conflict, both countries sought to further their interests by arming and assisting their 
supporters on the ground. Clarke and Tabatabai (2018) explain how the two states managed 
to develop a pragmatic relationship, as they felt threatened by the Kurds’ separation 
movements in both countries. Moreover, according to Kirişci (2019) and Hiro (2017), both 
countries have good economic cooperation, although there are sectarian differences 
between them.  
 Turkey and Saudi Arabia are both Sunni-majority countries. Both countries agree 
on toppling President Assad in Syria (Gause, 2014), so Turkey’s border became the 
gateway for jihadists and extremist Islamist groups to fight in Syria against President Assad 
(Spencer & Sanchez, 2014). Nevertheless, there has been a clash between Turkey and Saudi 
Arabia over the leadership of the Sunni world and the support of Muslim brotherhood. Hiro 
(2017) explains how Turkey is looking forward to leading the Sunni world as an heir to the 
Ottoman Empire. Also, he highlights a recent update about Turkey’s relationship with Qatar. 
Turkey has backed Qatar after Saudi Arabia and other Arab states cut all economic and 
diplomatic ties. Turkey sent food and troops in support of Qatar, which caused anger in 
Saudi Arabia. In October 2018, the killing of the Saudi dissident journalist Jamal 
Khashoggi in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul in Turkey severed the relationship between 
Turkey and Saudi Arabia as Turkey accused Saudi Arabia of violating the Turkish 
sovereignty (Alterman, 2018).  
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4.4.11 Gulf states of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in which Saudi Arabia plays the leadership 
role, has passed through difficult times since its establishment. Harb (2017) explains that 
the ongoing intra-GCC crisis between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain against Qatar, 
has increased Iranian influence in the region, and it has affected the unity of the GCC. The 
next few pages highlight some points for each country. 
4.4.11.1 The United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
UAE has borders with the Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Saudi Arabia.  
Ulrichsen (2017) describes the bilateral relations between the UAE and Iran as 
multidimensional relations. Wehrey et al. (2009) highlight one of the most conflictual 
points between both countries, the territorial dispute over Abu Musa and the Greater and 
Lesser Tunbs islands. Also, the UAE has high numbers of Iranian expatriate population and 
Iranian investment, which complicated the relationships. 
Given the fact that the UAE has seven different emirates, their rulers have struggled 
at times to draw one policy towards Iran. Ulrichsen (2017) and Wehrey et al. (2009) give 
examples of two emirates, Dubai and Sharjah, that have economic relationships with Iran, 
and they both are keen on keeping good relationships, whereas Abu Dhabi has a different 
standpoint against Iran’s activities in the region. Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain 
strategic partners. Both countries agree on many various issues, such as the war in Yemen, 






The Kingdom of Bahrain (Bahrain) is an archipelago in the Arabian Gulf, east of 
Saudi Arabia, with a strategic central location in the Arabian Gulf. Until 1970, Bahrain was 
under Iran’s sovereignty, but Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi abandoned sovereignty’s 
claims after secret Anglo-Iranian negotiations (Alvandi, 2010; Ulrichsen, 2013). There has 
been a long tension in the bilateral relationship between Bahrain and Iran. Wehrey et al. 
(2009) give an example of a failed coup attempt in the early 1980s, after the Iranian 
Revolution, when some Shias, who received training and funding by Iran, according to the 
government of Bahrain, planned a coup before the government discovered it. Also, Iran is 
critical of Bahrain as it hosts the fifth fleet of the U.S. Army, the Great Satan.  
On the other hand, Bahrain is a strong ally of Saudi Arabia. There has been a long 
history of support between the two monarchies to the extent that Bahrain, according to 
Downs (2012), is a puppet of Saudi Arabia.  
4.4.11.3 Qatar  
Wehrey, Karasik, Nader, Ghez, and Hansell (2009) explain the Saudi-Qatari 
relationship. On the one hand, there has been a history of tensions between the two states 
in the early days of state-building when Ibn Saud claimed on Qatari territory besides the 
disputes between the two states about GCC leadership. Also, Qatar used its powerful media 
tool, Al-Jazeera channels, to frequently criticize the Saudi regime, which contributed to 
high levels of tension between both countries. Hiro (2017) discusses the recent tensions in 
bilateral relationships when Saudi Arabia, among other Arab countries, U.A.E, Egypt, and 
Bahrain, demanded that Qatar curbs diplomatic ties with Iran and closes its diplomatic 
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missions beside other demands, which Qatar ignored. So, these Arab countries imposed a 
boycott on Qatar, severed diplomatic relations, and banned Qatari airplanes and ships from 
utilizing their airspace and sea routes. 
On the other hand, Wehrey et al. (2009) highlight the bilateral relations between 
Qatar and Iran. Qatar has worked with Iran on several fronts in Lebanon and Syria. Also, 
Qatar was the only country to reject a U.N. Security Council resolution calling for Iran to 
halt uranium enrichment in 2006. Additionally, Kamrava (2017) gives other examples of 
the close relationship. For example, both countries share the world’s largest natural gas 
structure, and they hold bilateral high-level meetings between both officials. Recently, Iran 
supported Qatar by sending food supplies and opening its airspace to Qatari flights, 
following the recent boycott on Qatar. 
4.4.11.4 Sultanate of Oman  
Sultanate of Oman or Oman has borders with the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, and 
Persian Gulf, UAE, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia (See figure 1). About 45% of the Muslim 
Population of Omani citizens are Ibadhi and Sunni, and about 5% are Shias, according to 
CIA World Factbook in 2019. 
On the one hand, the Sultanate of Oman has a warm and close historical relationship 
with Iran (Valeri, 2017; Wehrey et al., 2009). Valeri (2017) traces the reasons behind the 
warm Omani-Iranian relations to the military assistance Oman received from Iran in the 
1970s to settle the uprising in the Dhofar War. Also, Oman shares a vast gas field in the 
Gulf with Iran. Moreover, Oman tries to avoid sectarian tensions with Shia groups who 
have been invaluable allies of the rulers. Oman has played the mediator role in many 
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different contexts. Schanzer and Salter (2019) highlight the role Oman played as a channel 
in the Iran–US secret talks, which resulted in the JCOPA nuclear deal in 2015. Also, Al-
Muslimi (2017) highlights Oman’s role as a mediator in the recent crisis between Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar. 
On the other hand, Oman has a historic relationship with Saudi Arabia, and both 
countries share a long borderline. Recently, Oman refused to join the Saudi-led coalition 
against Yemen. Nazemroaya (2015) argues that the reasons behind this decision were 
Oman’s worry about Saudi’s use of sectarianism to ignite a confrontation with Iran.  
4.4.11.5 Kuwait 
Wehrey et al. (2009) explain how Kuwait is different from other Gulf countries. 
Kuwait succeeded in integrating its Shia citizens in the community so that the sectarian 
tensions had no place in the political agenda of Kuwait. When it comes to the relationship 
with Iran, Reuters’ report in 2017 details the milestones in the bilateral relations, which 
have been mainly shaped by geo-political forces. For example, after a raid on the so-called 
“Abdali cell” in 2015, Kuwait convicted 23 men, one Iranian and the rest Kuwaitis, of 
spying for Iran and Hezbollah. In 2017, Kuwait ordered the expulsion of the Iranian 
ambassador and 14 other diplomats for alleged links to “spy and terror” cell (Westall, 2017, 
para. 1). Also, another milestone in the bilateral relationship was Kuwait’s support to Iraq 
in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War.  
 Kuwait is a strong ally to Saudi Arabia. Albloshi (2018) explains that the shared 
threats from Iraq during the 1990s cemented Kuwaiti-Saudi ties. Both countries agree on 
many cases, such as their criticism of the Arab Spring, but Kuwait disagrees with Saudi 
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Arabia about the JCPOA. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Kuwait welcomed the agreement and did 
not endorse the U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA. 
4.6 Conflict mapping 
Given the complexity of the conflict and the large number of stakeholders, 
relative powers, and influences, the next part uses the framework developed by Matthew 
Levinger (2013), as suggested in Chapter Two, to provide understanding about the critical 
dynamics of the conflicts. Figure 8 presents a conflict map between Saudi Arabia, Iran, 

















Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations 
This thesis aimed to explain the contemporary rise of sectarian violence in the 
Middle East by examining the milestone events that have contributed to the sectarian 
violence through a case study between Saudi Arabia, as a representative of Sunni Islam, 
and Iran, as a representative of Shia Islam. Choosing Iran and Saudi Arabia for the case 
study was because of their contest for regional hegemony and their claims for 
exceptionalism. Also, both regimes rest on religious authority besides a similar social 
contract between the government and the people. 
This research identified and analyzed many dimensions of the sectarian conflict in 
the Middle East based on a qualitative analysis of the history of Islam, theories of Conflict 
Resolution, literature of International Relations, and the response of Saudi Arabia and Iran 
to recent regional events, such as the Iranian Revolution, the U.S. led invasion to Iraq, the 
Arab uprisings, and Iran Nuclear deal. The Iranian Revolution brought the clerics to power 
with a doctrine of exporting revolution to other Islamic states and delegitimizing the Arab 
monarchies in the region.  
The U.S. invasion of Iraq changed the long-established power dynamics in Iraq and 
empowered the Shia of Iraq, who were supported by Iran, so that other Sunni countries 
worried about the Iranian influence in Iraq, which threatened their regimes by emboldening 
the Shia citizens in the Gulf countries. The Arab uprisings inspired other countries to revolt 
against discrimination and corruption, and threatened the Arab monarchies who quelled the 
demonstrations in their countries and translated these demonstrations into sectarian 
narratives. Last but not least, the Iran Nuclear Deal with its consequences, alarmed Saudi 
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Arabia and other Sunni states about the empowerment of Iran in the region. This thesis 
does not suggest that these events are the only reasons of the rise of sectarian violence; 
instead, this thesis argues that the combination of these events with the history of 
colonization, and authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, besides the role of external 
factors and conflict entrepreneurs, who have interests in sustaining the conflicts.  
Given the complexity of the conflict and instead of using single theoretical 
approach, the multi-dimensional Conflict Analysis Framework by Levinger was used to 
analyze the Saudi-Iranian rivalry through investigating strategic, political, socioeconomic, 
psychological, and cultural dimensions of the conflict to provide multidisciplinary 
understanding to policymakers, who could make decisions, contributing to the stability of 
the Middle East. As illustrated through the conflict map and the stakeholders’ analysis, the 
conflict is complex, with different actors. The rivalry between the two powers has affected 
the stability of the Middle East. Many stakeholders are motivated by economic interest or 
political interests, such as secession or territorial partition. The proxy wars and the strategic 
partnerships in the region, as analyzed in Chapter Four, prove the geopolitical interests are 
more considerable than the ideological ones.  
Furthermore, this thesis concludes that political interests are important factors to 
consider when understanding and analyzing the rise of sectarian violence in the Middle 
East. The political use of religion succeeded, directly and indirectly, in shaping sectarian 
narratives in the Middle East. The use of religion in the sectarian conflict has been a 
characteristic element in the Middle East conflicts. Given the wide interpretation of the 
Quran and the empowerment of clerics through the state, religion has been a tool to shore 
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up regimes and increase sectarian narratives. Through the clerics and religious scholar, 
Islam, appeared as a tool to justify the violence and give rulers impunity. 
Each country has its own significant circumstances, such as the state apparatus, the 
relationship between the government and the people, and the geopolitical interests, so 
giving a recipe to deal with all conflicts is hard. Conflict resolution is a long term process 
that addresses the root causes of the conflict and understands the positions and interests of 
each party in order to reach a resolution. Solutions should be tailored to the specific conflict. 
In our case study, the Shias have witnessed a long history of grievances, horizontal 
inequalities, and discrimination. Also, Shias in Saudi Arabia have been a partner in the 
country, so part of the resolution is reintegrating them into society, giving them religious 
freedom, and including them in the governmental positions. Another crucial 
recommendation is conducting a community and national dialogue to bring all parties 
together to share and listen to each other. In addition, ending hate speech against Shias in 
the media by activating laws against hate speech. Also, the education curriculum should be 
revised to ensure the values of diversity and respects to others. Acceptance of the rights of 
others and equitable distribution of resources are two pillars of positive peace, according 
to the Global Peace Index (2019). 
Many scholars talk about the possibility of having peace and end the sectarian 
violence in the Middle East. Gause (2014) argues that the rapprochement between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran could happen if the leaders of both countries have the political will. Also, 
Al-Badi (2017) highlights the importance of shared economic interests as a way to reduce 
tension and contribute to confidence-building measures between the two rivals. Bahgat, 
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Ehteshami, and Quilliam (2017) argue that the Iranian relationships with its Arab neighbors 
are not uniform, and there are many forces that could shape the future of relationships in 
the coming years, such as the change in the leadership and changes in energy markets. 
The negative effects of Saudi-Iranian rivalry on the international peace and security 
are evident, including destabilizing the Middle East region, anti-Shia sentiments spreading 
to other parts of the world, such as Nigeria, Indonesia, and Malaysia, the humanitarian and 
immigration crisis, fragile states, and the empowerment of fundamentalist groups. The 
United States and other world powers should reconsider their roles in the Middle East and 
re-identify their interests in the region. The U.S. policy should take into consideration 
including, not excluding, Iran in crafting the vision for the Middle East by using diplomacy, 
not force, and third-party intervention. Oman could play this role, based on its history of 
mediating regional conflicts, besides its good relationships with Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
Building trust through an inclusive peace is a long-term process that requires the efforts of 
the international community and the political will of all parties of the conflicts. 
Finally, based on these conclusions, scholars should consider doing fieldwork and 
interviews in Saudi Arabia and Iran, to test and track the peoples’ narratives on the factors 
indicated in this thesis. Also, to better understand the implications of the contemporary 
sectarian conflict, future studies could analyze social media platforms in the Middle East 
to understand how sectarianism is voiced via social media. Further research is needed to 
determine the effects of future political changes on the conflict, such as the upcoming U.S. 
presidential elections in 2020, the Iranian presidential elections in 2021, and the potential 
change in the Saudi royal family.  
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Figure 1. Map of the Greater Middle East 




Figure 2. Map of Saudi Arabia 
                                               Source: (CIA, 2018) 
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Figure 3. Map of Iran 
Source: (CIA, 2019) 
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Figure 4. The political power structure of Iran 
Source: (BBC, 2009) 
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Figure 5. Saudi Arabia’s Royal family tree. 
Source: (Middle East Eye, 2015) 
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Figure 6. The Sectarian Balance of Power in the Middle East 
Source: (Stratfor, 2015) 
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Figure 7. Shia Crescent 
       Source: (Parchizadeh, 2018) 
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Figure 8. Stakeholders Map 
Source: (Eltally, 2019) 
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